Pacto Anti-Comintern

Anti-Comintern Pact

O Pacto Anti-Comintern ( alemão : Antikominternpakt ; italiano : Patto anticomintern ; japonês :防共協定, Bōkyō kyōtei ), oficialmente o Acordo contra a Internacional Comunista (alemão: Abkommen gegen die Kommunistische Internationale ; japonês: Kyōsan "intānashonaru" ni taisuru kyōtei (共産「インターナショナル」ニ対スル協定) foi um pacto anticomunista celebrado entre a Alemanha nazista e o Império do Japãoem 25 de novembro de 1936 e foi dirigido contra a Internacional Comunista (Comintern). Foi assinado pelo embaixador alemão Joachim von Ribbentrop e pelo embaixador japonês na Alemanha Kintomo Mushanokōji . [1] : 188–189 A  Itália aderiu em 1937, mas foi legalmente reconhecida como signatária original pelos termos de sua entrada. Espanha e Hungria aderiram em 1939. Outros países aderiram durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial. [2] : 49 

Pacto Anti-Comintern
Anti-Comintern Pact signing 1936.jpg
O embaixador japonês na Alemanha Kintomo Mushanokōji e o embaixador alemão Joachim von Ribbentrop assinam o Pacto Anti-Comintern.
Tipo Pacto
Redigido 23 de outubro de 1936
Assinado 25 de novembro de 1936
Localização Berlim , Alemanha
Signatários
Signatários iniciais

Antes da Segunda Guerra Mundial


Durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial

Os signatários japoneses esperavam que o Pacto Anti-Comintern fosse efetivamente uma aliança contra a União Soviética , que é certamente como os soviéticos o perceberam. [3] : 226  Havia também um protocolo adicional secreto que especificava uma política conjunta germano-japonesa especificamente voltada contra a União Soviética. [1] : 188–189  [4] : 197  No entanto, após a adesão da Itália fascista ao pacto e especialmente a reaproximação germano-soviética após o Pacto Molotov-Ribbentrop , ganhou uma identidade cada vez mais anti-ocidental e anti- britânica como Nós vamos. [5] : 44  [6] : 13 

Após agosto de 1939, o Japão se distanciou da Alemanha como resultado do Pacto Molotov-Ribbentrop. [3] : 24  [7] : 40  O Pacto Anti-Comintern foi seguido pelo Pacto Tripartite de setembro de 1940 , que identificou os Estados Unidos como a principal ameaça ao invés da União Soviética, no entanto, em dezembro de 1941, isso também era praticamente inoperante. [8] O Pacto Anti-Comintern foi posteriormente renovado em novembro de 1941 e viu a entrada de vários novos membros no pacto. [2] : 49  O regime nazista viu a assinatura do Pacto Anti-Comintern como um "teste decisivo de lealdade". [9]

Fundo

Eventos que levaram à Segunda Guerra Mundial
  1. Treaty of Versailles 1919
  2. Polish–Soviet War 1919
  3. Treaty of Trianon 1920
  4. Treaty of Rapallo 1920
  5. Franco-Polish alliance 1921
  6. March on Rome 1922
  7. Corfu incident 1923
  8. Occupation of the Ruhr 1923–1925
  9. Mein Kampf 1925
  10. Second Italo-Senussi War 1923–1932
  11. Dawes Plan 1924
  12. Locarno Treaties 1925
  13. Young Plan 1929
  14. Japanese invasion of Manchuria 1931
  15. Pacification of Manchukuo 1931–1942
  16. January 28 incident 1932
  17. Geneva Conference 1932–1934
  18. Defense of the Great Wall 1933
  19. Battle of Rehe 1933
  20. Nazis' rise to power in Germany 1933
  21. Tanggu Truce 1933
  22. Italo-Soviet Pact 1933
  23. Inner Mongolian Campaign 1933–1936
  24. German–Polish declaration of non-aggression 1934
  25. Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance 1935
  26. Soviet–Czechoslovakia Treaty of Mutual Assistance 1935
  27. He–Umezu Agreement 1935
  28. Anglo-German Naval Agreement 1935
  29. December 9th Movement
  30. Second Italo-Ethiopian War 1935–1936
  31. Remilitarization of the Rhineland 1936
  32. Spanish Civil War 1936–1939
  33. Italo-German "Axis" protocol 1936
  34. Anti-Comintern Pact 1936
  35. Suiyuan campaign 1936
  36. Xi'an Incident 1936
  37. Second Sino-Japanese War 1937–1945
  38. USS Panay incident 1937
  39. Anschluss Mar. 1938
  40. May Crisis May 1938
  41. Battle of Lake Khasan July–Aug. 1938
  42. Bled Agreement Aug. 1938
  43. Undeclared German–Czechoslovak War Sep. 1938
  44. Munich Agreement Sep. 1938
  45. First Vienna Award Nov. 1938
  46. German occupation of Czechoslovakia Mar. 1939
  47. Hungarian invasion of Carpatho-Ukraine Mar. 1939
  48. German ultimatum to Lithuania Mar. 1939
  49. Slovak–Hungarian War Mar. 1939
  50. Final offensive of the Spanish Civil War Mar.–Apr. 1939
  51. Danzig Crisis Mar.–Aug. 1939
  52. British guarantee to Poland Mar. 1939
  53. Italian invasion of Albania Apr. 1939
  54. Soviet–British–French Moscow negotiations Apr.–Aug. 1939
  55. Pact of Steel May 1939
  56. Battles of Khalkhin Gol May–Sep. 1939
  57. Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact Aug. 1939
  58. Invasion of Poland Sep. 1939

Alemanha

"Anti-Komintern" (GDAV)

O Anti-Komintern , oficialmente Gesamtverband Deutscher antikommunistischer Vereinigungen (abreviatura GDAV, 'associação geral das federações anticomunistas alemãs'), [10] : 576  foi uma agência alemã estabelecida por Joseph Goebbels em 1933. [10] : 573  Sua atividades cobriam uma ampla gama de operações destinadas a denunciar o comunismo em geral e a União Soviética em particular, [10] : 580  empurrar propaganda anti- semita e angariar apoio nacional e internacional para a política nazista. [10] : 574  Foi colocado sob a liderança do Dr. Adolf Ehrt [ de]. Sob a liderança de Ehrt, o Comintern foi denunciado como 'sem Deus' em referência ao seu ateísmo . [10] : 581  A partir de julho de 1936, a Guerra Civil Espanhola tornou-se o foco principal das publicações do Anti-Komintern. [10] : 580 

Uma das saídas mais significativas do Anti-Komintern foi o lançamento internacional de 1936 Der Weltbolschewismus , no qual conectou várias teorias de conspiração anticomunistas e antissemitas para o consumo do público internacional. O livro não foi lançado na própria Alemanha para evitar conflito entre os vários relatos do livro com a propaganda estatal alemã. [10] : 581 

Acordo Naval Anglo-Alemão

Em 18 de junho de 1935, o Reino Unido e a Alemanha assinaram o Acordo Naval Anglo-Alemão , que foi uma surpresa para os japoneses. [11] : 53  Isto marcou o início de uma série de tentativas de Adolf Hitler para melhorar as relações entre os dois países. Na mente de Hitler, um relacionamento positivo com o Reino Unido enfraqueceria os aliados britânicos, França e Itália (naquele momento ainda um rival alemão) e conteria a União Soviética. [12] : 289  Hitler mais tarde também enviaria Ribbentrop a Londres com a tarefa específica de garantir a adesão britânica ao Pacto Anti-Comintern durante seu mandato de 1936-1938 como embaixador alemão no Reino Unido, declarando a adesão britânica ao pacto como seu "maior desejo". [6] : 154–155  [13] : 262–263 

No Japão, o tratado foi visto com desconfiança. Mushanokōji em 4 de julho de 1935 em uma reunião da embaixada [a] declarou sua opinião de que seria imprudente para o Japão se apressar em uma aliança com a Alemanha, pois ele (corretamente) interpretou o Acordo Naval Anglo-Alemão como uma tentativa alemã de aliar o Reino Unido . Os Estados Unidos e a Grã-Bretanha eram hostis ao Japão desde o Incidente de Mukden de 1931, e Mushanokōji temia que o Japão pudesse se isolar se a Alemanha acabasse escolhendo uma parceria com a Grã-Bretanha em vez de uma parceria com o Japão. [11] : 53 

Autoridades e ideologias concorrentes na política externa alemã

A execução da política externa alemã foi nominalmente deixada para o Ministério das Relações Exteriores de Konstantin von Neurath , mas Joachim von Ribbentrop chefiou o semi-autônomo Dienststelle Ribbentrop , criado no final de 1934, [14] : 14  onde ele poderia realizar os pedidos pessoais de política externa de Hitler independentemente do consentimento do Ministério das Relações Exteriores. Isso criou uma rivalidade entre os dois serviços. [11] : 62  Enquanto Hitler favorecia Ribbentrop como seu defensor pessoal da política externa, ele pelo menos inicialmente manteve a equipe de diplomatas de carreira de Neurath para maximizar a legitimidade diplomática de seu governo no exterior. [14] : 12  Hiroshi Oshima, adido militar japonês em Berlim e o indivíduo mais importante do lado japonês das negociações do Pacto Anti-Comintern, interpretou a estrutura do serviço externo alemão como aquela em que a estrutura de poder era tal que "foi apenas Hitler e Ribbentrop que decidiam a política externa , e que, portanto, não adiantava falar com seus subordinados". Ōshima tentou assim levar qualquer passo importante das negociações diretamente para as mesas de Ribbentrop ou Hitler. [15] : 316–317 

Enquanto Ribbentrop foi o diplomata pessoal de Hitler, sua visão pessoal sobre diplomacia geoestratégica variou bastante distintamente de Hitler durante o final da década de 1930. Considerando que Hitler favoreceu uma política amigável para a Grã-Bretanha para eliminar a União Soviética, [6] : 154-155  Ribbentrop viu os aliados ocidentais como o principal inimigo da Alemanha e projetou grande parte da política externa alemã, incluindo o Pacto Anti-Comintern, com o objetivo de conter o Império Britânico em mente. [16] : 268  Quando se tratava do Japão, Ribbentrop acreditava que o foco japonês na União Soviética como seu principal antagonista poderia ser redirecionado para o Reino Unido, permitindo assim que o Japão fosse um parceiro na coalizão anti-britânica de Ribbentrop. [16] : 271 

O alinhamento alemão com o Japão, contra a vontade do tradicionalmente sinófilo serviço estrangeiro alemão e do público alemão em geral, começou no final de 1933. [17] : 609 

Tratados entre guerras germano-soviéticos

Durante a época da República de Weimar , o governo alemão fez grandes tratados com a URSS, incluindo o Tratado de Rapallo de 1922 e o Tratado de Berlim de 1926 . [b] [18] : 575 

Em uma nota no dia da assinatura do Pacto Anti-Comintern, 25 de novembro de 1936, Ribbentrop informou Mushanokōji que o governo alemão considerava os termos desses dois tratados como nulos sob o protocolo adicional secreto. [4] : 199  Mushanokōji respondeu no mesmo dia, expressando a "sincera satisfação" do governo japonês com a postura alemã. [4] : 199–200  Isso foi resultado da insistência do governo japonês, principalmente em um pedido em 24 de julho de 1936, para esclarecer as implicações do tratado para tratados bilaterais anteriores entre as partes e a União Soviética. [19] : 33–34 

Japão

Proposta de Igualdade Racial de 1919, Conferência Naval de Washington de 1922

O Japão havia lutado na Grande Guerra ao lado das vitoriosas Potências da Entente . No entanto, como parte da Conferência Naval de Washington de 1922 , os Estados Unidos e o Reino Unido conseguiram limitar as forças navais do Japão por tratado e forçar o Japão a entregar seus ganhos na China durante a Primeira Guerra Mundial. Tóquio ganhou durante a conferência – recebeu paridade com EUA e Reino Unido no Oceano Pacífico e teve o direito de construir uma marinha que superaria as marinhas francesa e italiana, além de ser reconhecida como a única potência colonial não ocidental do mundo – a tratado era impopular no Japão. Nacionalistas japoneses, assim como a Marinha Imperial Japonesa, denunciaram os aspectos restritivos do tratado. [20]: 193–194  [21] : 101 

Culturalmente, o Tratado de Washington de 1922 foi visto como mais uma traição pelas potências ocidentais, depois que as propostas japonesas de igualdade racial garantida sob a Liga das Nações foram rejeitadas em 1919. [22] [21] : 68  Essa percepção de humilhação nacional foi ainda mais acelerado pela crise econômica que o Japão experimentou na década de 1920, exemplificado pelo pânico financeiro de 1927 no Japão ( crise financeira Shōwa ), que também causou instabilidade política e a queda do primeiro gabinete de Reijirō Wakatsuki , e pela Grande Depressão de 1929 . [19] : 9  historiador alemão Bernd Martinapelidado a Conferência Naval de Washington o "Japonês ' Versalhes '." [17] : 607 

Militarização da sociedade japonesa e agressão contra a China

Tropas japonesas entrando em Shenyang durante o Incidente de Mukden de 1931

O Incidente de Mukden de 18 de setembro de 1931 iniciou o período de agressão japonesa na Ásia entre 1931 e 1945, às vezes chamado de Guerra dos Quinze Anos . [23] : 1–2 

A reação diplomática das grandes potências europeias ao ataque do Japão contra a China foi insuficiente para deter o avanço japonês, apesar dos contínuos apelos chineses à Liga das Nações . Este ataque, que não teve nenhuma ordem central de Tóquio o precedeu e foi uma decisão autônoma da liderança do Exército de Kwantung , [17] : 608-609  foi mantido confinado ao nordeste da Chinapelos comandantes japoneses na esperança de que isso seria suficiente para manter as respostas européias mornas e, assim, promover os avanços japoneses. Essa estimativa provou ser precisa, e o Reino Unido, em particular, ficou mais do que feliz em deixar o Japão prosseguir na Manchúria enquanto os interesses britânicos no sul e no centro da China permanecessem intactos. Mesmo após o Incidente de Xangai de 28 de janeiro de 1932, a atitude britânica permaneceu amigável à causa japonesa e indiferente aos pedidos chineses de assistência. Entre as poucas exceções a isso estavam os esforços britânicos para trazer a paz na própria cidade de Xangai, onde o Reino Unido tinha interesses econômicos diretos.

A Pacificação Japonesa de Manchukuo , por outro lado, foi vista na Grã-Bretanha como um desenvolvimento positivo que, em última análise, ajudaria a dispersar a atividade dos bandidos. [23] : 3–6  Em fevereiro de 1932, os japoneses estabeleceram um estado fantoche no nordeste da China, o Império de Manchukuo , nominalmente liderado por Puyi , o último imperador destronado da dinastia Qing (r. 1908–1912, 1917). [24] : 65–73 

Após o Relatório Lytton , que colocou a culpa do conflito na Manchúria firmemente aos pés dos japoneses, Sir John Simon , o secretário de Relações Exteriores do Reino Unido, não condenou o Japão em seu discurso em 7 de dezembro de 1932 e, posteriormente, ganhou o favor de políticos japoneses como Yōsuke Matsuoka , que viam a fraca resposta britânica como mais um incentivo para o curso japonês na China. O Japão deixou a Liga das Nações como resultado do Relatório Lytton em fevereiro de 1933.

A Trégua Tanggu encerrou as hostilidades na Manchúria, mas a ambição japonesa na China ainda não estava satisfeita. Entre 1933 e 1936, o ministro das Relações Exteriores japonês Kōki Hirota perseguiu o Hirota wakyo gaiko , a 'diplomacia amigável de Hirota'. Resumido pela Doutrina Amau de 1934, o Japão se via como o poder protetor de todo o Leste Asiático, espelhando o papel dos Estados Unidos nas Américas sob a Doutrina Monroe de 1823. Essa postura foi novamente permitida pelas grandes potências européias, e Neville Chamberlain até tentou negociar um pacto de não agressão anglo-japonês para melhorar as relações britânicas com o Japão em 1934. [23] : 6–7 Em segredo, a liderança da política externa de Hirota estabeleceu uma série de metas altamente ambiciosas para a diplomacia japonesa. Isso incluiu um acúmulo industrial em Manchukuo, a aquisição de recursos do norte da China por meio da subjugação, a conquista do Pacífico ocidental e do sudeste da Ásia e os preparativos para uma guerra contra a União Soviética. [21] : 308 

"A essência da defesa nacional e propostas para fortalecê-la" (outubro de 1934)

A diplomacia cooperativa não resolverá a atual emergência, que não é um incidente isolado, mas representa uma emergência mundial que surgiu apesar dos grandes esforços feitos por todos os países desde a Guerra Mundial. O Japão deve aproveitar o glorioso desafio colocado pelo Incidente da Manchúria e nossa retirada da Liga das Nações. Devemos aceitar nosso destino, recusando-nos firmemente a ser enfraquecidos evitando o desafio, e devemos ter a coragem de aproveitar esta oportunidade para formular um grande plano para os próximos cem anos de nosso país.

Ohata, Tokushiro (1976). "O Pacto Anti-Comintern, 1935-1939". Em Morley, James William (ed.). "Diplomacia de dissuasão: Japão, Alemanha e URSS, 1935-1940". pág. 12. ISBN  9780231089692 .

O exército japonês em outubro de 1934 publicou um panfleto intitulado "A Essência da Defesa Nacional e Propostas para Fortalecê-la", indo diretamente contra a tentativa de reconciliação diplomática que foi ao mesmo tempo (pelo menos sem entusiasmo) tentada pelo governo civil em Tóquio (chamada "diplomacia Shidehara" em homenagem ao ex-primeiro-ministro Kijūrō Shidehara ). O panfleto exigia uma submissão completa de todos os aspectos da política externa e interna à abrangente questão da "defesa nacional" e da preparação da nação para a guerra total. Denunciou ainda a "diplomacia cooperativa", elogiou a decisão japonesa de se retirar da Liga das Nações e pediu ao Japão que aceitasse seu destino e formulasse um grande plano para os próximos 100 anos.

Os militares posteriormente continuaram sua prática de publicar panfletos com conteúdo político aberto sem coordenação prévia com o governo civil. Em novembro de 1936, na época da conclusão do Pacto Anti-Comintern, o panfleto do exército "Aperfeiçoando a preparação do exército e o espírito necessário" defendia o fortalecimento do exército e pedia abertamente a reforma do governo civil e a reforma do estado japonês para melhor atender aos objetivos dos militares. [19] : 12–13 

Lutas de poder doméstico sobre a política externa japonesa

O sistema do estado imperial japonês foi apelidado de "um cone sem vértice" pelo historiador japonês Ken Ishida . O Exército Imperial Japonês (IJA), a Marinha Imperial Japonesa (IJN) e o Ministério das Relações Exteriores japonês tinham sua própria agenda em relação a como o Japão deveria orientar sua política externa. O sistema japonês, altamente tradicional e baseado no valor espiritual e sociocultural do imperador Hirohito , também envolvia a corte imperial, que servia de amortecedor entre esses três grupos rivais e o imperador no topo, o que permitia a Hirohito escapar da política direta. responsabilidades por quaisquer falhas e contratempos que o sistema possa produzir. [25] : 6–8 

Negociações do tratado de pesca japonês-soviético e disputas de fronteira

Na época das negociações para o Pacto Anti-Comintern, o governo japonês também estava em negociações com o governo soviético sobre os direitos de pesca no Mar do Japão. Como o protocolo adicional secreto do Pacto Anti-Comintern entre a Alemanha e o Japão contra a URSS era proibir tratados políticos de qualquer um dos Estados com a União Soviética sem o consentimento expresso da outra parte do Pacto Anti-Comintern, o embaixador japonês Mushanokōji estava preocupado se o Pacto resultaria em consequências para as negociações nipo-soviéticas. Ele perguntou sobre isso em uma carta a Ribbentrop após a assinatura do tratado em 25 de novembro, e também mencionou a questão das questões de fronteira entre Manchukuo controlado pelos japoneses e a URSS. Ribbentrop confirmou o consentimento do governo alemão de que o Japão era autônomo e livre para prosseguir nos assuntos mencionados por Mushanokōji sua resposta no mesmo dia. [4] : 198 

Semelhanças e contradições ideológicas entre a Alemanha nazista e o Japão imperial

O Pacto Anti-Comintern foi mais uma declaração do que um compromisso político real, e a declaração foi de alinhamento ideológico mútuo e ligação diplomática um com o outro. [26] : 7  [27] : 27  Ambos os países compartilharam exemplos de ideologias raciais politicamente significativas, com Alfred Rosenberg na Alemanha e Shūmei Ōkawano Japão tornando-se os principais ideólogos racistas. Enquanto Rosenberg gozava do apoio do governo e era uma figura central do partido após a ascensão dos nazistas ao poder em 1933, o público de Ōkawa era mais limitado. Ōkawa encontrou sua principal base de apoio com jovens oficiais militares nacionalistas, particularmente aqueles do Exército de Kwantung, a unidade militar que instigou a invasão inicial do nordeste da China pelo Japão em 1931. [17] : 608  O trabalho de Ōkawa foi no final de 1936 promovido peloinfluente panfleto de política externa "Os Princípios Únicos Orientadores da Diplomacia Japonesa", no qual Takeo expôs uma visão de uma orientação de longo prazo da diplomacia japonesa em torno de uma política expansionista racialmente justificada baseada em valores espirituais japoneses tradicionais, em vez do imperialismo de estilo ocidental. O panfleto de Nimiya era especialmente popular entre os jovens burocratas e estudantes que estavam prestes a entrar na política estatal japonesa no final dos anos 1930 e início dos anos 1940. [19] : 16 

"A Política Externa do Japão Imperial" (8 de agosto de 1936)

A pressão revolucionária da União Soviética sobre a Ásia aumenta à medida que continua a fortalecer sua defesa nacional e sua posição internacional por meio de um enorme programa de rearmamento. Seu objetivo, uma penetração vermelha em muitas áreas, interfere na política do Japão no Leste Asiático e representa uma grave ameaça à defesa de nosso império. Frustrar a intenção agressiva da União Soviética, portanto, tornou-se o elemento mais crucial em nossa diplomacia. Este objetivo deve ser alcançado por meios diplomáticos e pela conclusão de um reforço da defesa.

[...]

A Alemanha tem interesses que se assemelham aos nossos em relação à União Soviética por causa do acordo especial que existe entre a Rússia e a França. Portanto, é do interesse da Alemanha cooperar conosco; e nós, por sua vez, devemos promover relações estreitas com a Alemanha, levando à aliança entre o Japão e a Alemanha. Esse relacionamento deve ser expandido para incluir a Polônia e outros países europeus amigos próximos à União Soviética, bem como outros países asiáticos e islâmicos, como uma restrição adicional à União Soviética.

Ohata, Tokushiro (1976). "O Pacto Anti-Comintern, 1935-1939". Em Morley, James William (ed.). "Diplomacia de dissuasão: Japão, Alemanha e URSS, 1935-1940". pág. 31. ISBN 9780231089692 . 

Os dois países compartilhavam um antagonista ideológico comum no comunismo, amplamente coberto pela mídia alemã e japonesa e percebido como uma ameaça real de subversão entre as elites políticas alemãs e japonesas. [21] : 143  Como resultado das reservas japonesas sobre uma aliança militar direta, o Pacto Anti-Comintern foi conceituado como um acordo anticomunista ao invés de uma aliança militar direta. [11] : 53  No entanto, o establishment militar japonês estava preocupado com o crescimento da força militar soviética, e os adidos militares japoneses na Europa realizaram conferências sobre a ameaça potencial vinda especificamente da URSS já em 1929 para discutir possíveis contramedidas. [15] : 314–315 O governo japonês em 8 de agosto de 1936 emitiu um documento interno que justificava especificamente a aliança germano-japonesa como uma resposta à crescente ameaça que a União Soviética representava na Ásia e aos estreitos paralelos entre os interesses japoneses e alemães em relação à URSS. Este documento também revelou intenções de incluir outros países europeus, islâmicos e asiáticos no pacto anti-soviético e especificamente nomeou a Polônia como um potencial candidato à adesão ao pacto. [19] : 31 

Ambos os movimentos japonês e alemão compartilhavam uma aversão à Liga das Nações, e ambos os países deixaram a Liga durante o ano de 1933. [17] : 609  Os dois países compartilhavam uma lista semelhante de adversários diplomáticos: o Reino Unido, os Estados Unidos, e a União Soviética. [14] : 1 

Embora as ideologias raciais alemã e japonesa da suposta superioridade da raça ariana e da raça Yamato , respectivamente, mostrassem paralelos, esses paralelos deveriam logicamente tornar a aliança menos provável, já que os fascismos dos dois países se viam como racialmente inferiores. Na verdade, o Mein Kampf de Hitler nomeia especificamente os japoneses como um exemplo de agrupamento racial no segundo de três níveis culturais, um passo abaixo da raça ariana no topo. [28] : 317–323  Para evitar complicações diplomáticas como resultado do pensamento racial alemão, a propaganda racista alemã na imprensa controlada pelo Estado foi desviada do tema do povo japonês para não irritar o Japão. [14]: 4 

Sétimo Congresso Mundial do Comintern

Declaração do Sétimo Congresso Mundial sobre a ameaça da Alemanha e do Japão

Diante das provocações de guerra dos fascistas alemães e dos militaristas japoneses e da aceleração dos armamentos pelos partidos de guerra nos países capitalistas [...] a palavra de ordem central dos partidos comunistas deve ser: luta pela paz. Todos os interessados ​​na preservação da paz devem ser atraídos para esta frente vital. A concentração de forças contra os principais instigadores da guerra em qualquer momento (no momento atual contra a Alemanha fascista e contra a Polônia e o Japão que estão aliados a ela) constitui uma tarefa muito importante dos partidos comunistas.

Stratman, George John (1970). Relações diplomáticas da Alemanha com o Japão 1933-1941. Teses de alunos de pós-graduação, dissertações e trabalhos profissionais. 2450. Universidade de Montana. pág. 18.

No Sétimo Congresso Mundial do Comintern em julho de 1935, seguindo o conselho de Georgi Dimitrov ao governo soviético que resultou das experiências de Dimitrov na França e na Áustria durante 1934, [29] : 35  a Internacional Comunista mudou drasticamente o curso que os partidos comunistas foram aconselhados a aceitar sistemas democráticos. Em vez de ver os partidos democráticos e fascistas como aliados politicamente ( social-fascismo ), os movimentos comunistas foram incentivados a se aliar às forças de esquerda e centristas (a política da frente popular ) para impedir que os direitistas ganhassem terreno.

Diplomaticamente, o Sétimo Congresso Mundial também trouxe a política de ' segurança coletiva ' na União Soviética, em que a URSS tentaria se alinhar com as democracias ocidentais para contrariar os regimes fascistas. [29] : 52–59  O Sétimo Congresso Mundial declarou especificamente a Alemanha fascista e o Japão, ao lado da Polônia, entre os principais instigadores da guerra no mundo.

Esta declaração acelerou os esforços de Ribbentrop para garantir uma aliança germano-japonesa contra a URSS, ou pelo menos uma promessa de não apoio à União Soviética em caso de guerra entre um dos países contra ela. [14] : 18  Essa mudança na política do Comintern também tornou urgente5 que os fascistas europeus evitassem o fortalecimento de frentes populares de esquerda contra eles. [30] : 595 

Papel da China nas relações germano-japonesas

A República da China era um importante parceiro dos alemães, mas um amargo inimigo do Império Japonês, já que o Japão havia invadido a Manchúria em 1931 . Embora Ribbentrop esperasse envolver tanto a China quanto o Japão em seu bloco anticomunista, [31] : 342–346  as contínuas hostilidades e a eventual eclosão da guerra tornaram a posição alemã ambivalente, incluindo a cooperação militar sino-alemã e o status de Alexander von Falkenhausen e outros conselheiros militares de Chiang Kai-shek , uma preocupação séria para ambos os estados asiáticos. Além disso, a China foi o maior parceiro comercial das empresas alemãs na Ásia. [11] : 51 A China também foi favorecida pelo estabelecimento militar alemão e pela indústria de armamento, pois os militares chineses eram um cliente importante para os fabricantes de armas alemães e a indústria pesada. As exportações chinesas para a Alemanha, incluindo entregas de estanho e tungstênio , também foram consideradas vitais. [14] : 32 

Durante seu tempo como embaixador japonês na Alemanha, Mushanokōji fez de um de seus objetivos minar as relações econômicas e diplomáticas germano-chinesas. [11] : 51  No serviço externo da Alemanha, Ribbentrop favoreceu a cooperação com o Japão, enquanto Neurath preferiu o alinhamento com a China. [13] : 262–263 

Uma das principais questões do serviço estrangeiro alemão em relação à ambivalência diplomática da Alemanha entre a China e o Japão foi o reconhecimento do estado fantoche japonês em Manchukuo, instalado após a invasão japonesa do nordeste da China em 1931. Um reconhecimento de Manchukuo, como sugerido pelo embaixador alemão em Tóquio Herbert von Dirksen a partir do início de 1934, teria apresentado claramente uma declaração alemã a favor do expansionismo japonês e teria perturbado os parceiros chineses da Alemanha. Como resultado da possível irritação do governo chinês e as possíveis dúvidas do governo soviético sobre a possível percepção de uma tentativa de cerco por uma entente germano-japonesa, tal reconhecimento de Manchukuo foi inicialmente contestado por Neurath e pelo Ministério das Relações Exteriores.[14] : 16 Em resposta ao seu pedido inicial para reconhecer Manchukuo, Dirksen foi instruído a evitar "qualquer relação próxima com o Japão que pudesse deixar [a Alemanha] aberta a ser suspeita de querer prestar assistência contra a Rússia". Essa cautela alemã em relação a qualquer ofensa lançada contra a União Soviética resultou da impressão em Berlim de que o Japão durante o ano de 1934 estava sob séria ameaça de cerco diplomático e militar. Especificamente, Dirksen também foi instruído a prestar muita atenção a quaisquer sinais de uma guerra em potencial entre o Japão e a URSS, que os alemães presumiram que a União Soviética provavelmente receberia a ajuda das democracias ocidentais se explodisse, embora essa guerra em potencial não foi percebido como imediatamente iminente. Sem considerar,[32] : 466–467 

Por sua vez, os estabelecimentos políticos e militares japoneses estavam em 1934 também menos do que certos sobre a utilidade do novo governo de Hitler na Alemanha, que Tóquio assumiu tentaria manter um relacionamento pacífico com a União Soviética e evitar qualquer alinhamento aberto com os inimigos de Moscou. . A desconfiança que o Japão sentia era em parte causada pela estreita relação entre a Alemanha e a China, que por sua vez era percebida como aliada da União Soviética contra o Japão. [14] : 17 

Após a assinatura do Pacto Anti-Comintern, Falkenhausen foi chamado de volta à Alemanha contra sua vontade após pressão japonesa em 1938. [33] A China acabou declarando guerra à Alemanha e à Itália, juntamente com o Japão, em 9 de dezembro de 1941, após o ataque japonês . sobre Pearl Harbor e a entrada americana na Segunda Guerra Mundial, citando o apoio alemão e italiano à agressão japonesa como motivo. [34]

Instabilidade na França

A situação doméstica na Terceira República Francesa era instável. Isso proporcionou a oportunidade para os rivais da França, especialmente a Alemanha, expandirem sua influência, ao mesmo tempo em que enfraqueceram os parceiros europeus da França, como Polônia e Tchecoslováquia .

O gabinete de Léon Blum , apoiado pela frente popular da França , assumiu as rédeas em junho de 1936. A instabilidade social e a violência política na França tornaram o governo francês cuidadoso e ineficaz na aplicação do poder diplomático e militar da França. [35] : 88  Hitler, que esperava que a frente popular da França resultasse em uma situação semelhante à Guerra Civil Espanhola, anunciou abertamente ao embaixador francês em 6 de outubro de 1936 que uma tomada comunista na França não seria tratada pela Alemanha como um assunto doméstico . [36] : 150 

In French foreign policy, the 1934 German–Polish Non-Aggression Pact had caused concerns about the stability of the French alliance system in eastern Europe, leading to a French realignment towards the Soviet Union that resulted in the 1936 Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance.[14]: 10 

German, Italian and Soviet involvement in the Spanish Civil War

The Spanish Civil War, in which Germany supported the Nationalists and the Soviet Union the Republicans, reinforced the urgency in the mind of the German leadership to create some sort of anti-Soviet military arrangement to counteract a potential aggression by the Soviet Union.[36]: 210  The Spanish nationalists also received aid from Mussolini's Italy (Corpo Truppe Volontarie), but the Italian attitude to a potential anti-communist or anti-Soviet agreement was initially the opposite of the German position: the Italians viewed the signing of an anti-communist treaty as superfluous, as Italy's anti-communist commitment was in the Italian viewpoint sufficiently proven in their support for the Spanish nationalists.[37]: 115 

The Spanish Civil War was viewed by the Germans as concrete proof that the teachings of the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern, which had been specifically aimed against Germany (and Japan), were indeed affecting geopolitics.[14]: 20 

Creation

Early designs by Dienststelle Ribbentrop and Hiroshi Ōshima

After the Anglo-German Naval Agreement and the Seventh World Congress, the German Dienststelle Ribbentrop envisioned in October 1935 an anti-communist diplomatic system that might involve both the Empire of Japan and the Republic of China. This idea had support on the Japanese side by Hiroshi Ōshima, then the military attaché for Japan in Berlin, although Ōshima was more concerned with a Japanese subjugation of China rather than with an equal Japanese-Chinese alliance against the Soviet Union.[31]: 342–346  The Nationalist government in China was unwilling to make deals with Japan as long as the Japanese occupation of Manchuria persisted, so Ōshima and Ribbentrop drafted a bilateral treaty between Germany and Japan.[38]: 76 

Originally, the treaty was scheduled for November 1935, and invitations were to be extended to China, the United Kingdom, Italy and Poland. However, the German military and diplomatic leadership stalled the treaty's realization, as they feared a breakdown in the German relations with China.[31]: 342–346  Furthermore, foreign minister Konstantin von Neurath was jealous of Ribbentrop's exalted position in foreign policy outside of the ministry's control.[11]: 63 

While the initial designs for the pact came from Dienststelle Ribbentrop,[31]: 342–346  Hiroshi Ōshima, who would himself become Japan's ambassador to Germany in 1938–1939 and 1941–1945, became very influential in the pact's outline on the Japanese side. While the government in Tokyo was not particularly proactive in the pact's creation, Ōshima and the staff of the Japanese embassy in Berlin were. When Mushanokōji stated his suspicions of the German intentions to the embassy personnel on 4 July 1935, Ōshima was the main source of disagreement within the staff.

Regardless, Mushanokōji ended up making the recommendation to the Japanese government to only pursue an alliance with German insofar as it did not lead to the deterioration of Japanese relations with the United Kingdom and United States.[11]: 53  Ōshima was a staunch anti-communist and veteran of the Japanese intervention in Siberia, and used his good connections within Germany, among others to Wilhelm Canaris of the Abwehr, to, without authorization from ambassador Mushanokōji, further his pro-German and anti-Soviet agenda within the embassy. Initially disgusted with the military and political weakness of the Weimar Republic when he first arrived in Germany in 1922, he became an admirer of Adolf Hitler following the National Socialists' rise to power in 1933, and concluded that "there were things in the new Germany which were worthy of serious consideration".[11]: 55–56  Ōshima was aided by the fact he spoke the German language with a high degree of fluency.[15]: 312 

His positive predispositions towards the NSDAP government made him useful in the anti-Soviet designs of the Imperial Japanese Army, which aimed to envelop the Soviet Union through an alliance with Germany, eventually planning to strike into Siberia to secure its natural resources for Japan (Hokushin-ron). Ōshima's instructions from the high command were to investigate the German government's stability, the future of the German military, and the state of German-Soviet military and diplomatic relations.[14]: 16 [15]: 313 

Ōshima followed his assignment diligently, and the high frequency of his visits to and inspections of the German military establishment was noted even by the American military attaché Hugh W. Rowan, one of whose tasks was to observe Japanese covert activity in Berlin. Rowan was soon convinced that Ōshima was "being given access to important technical information in possession of the German army". The threat posed by the Soviet Union remained Ōshima's principal concern, and he aggressively sought out all German information on Soviet military strength he could attain. His aforementioned relationship with Canaris of the Abwehr was also largely based on the prospect of a potential German-Japanese intelligence service cooperation against the Soviet Union. By 1937, he would also forge close contacts with Wilhelm Keitel, the later Chief of OKW.[15]: 314–315 

Ribbentrop's testimony regarding the Anti-Comintern Pact's creation

[T]he question arose as to how a way could be found at all to win over other countries to counter communistic tendencies. The problem, therefore, was an ideological one. In the year 1933, I believe, Hitler discussed with me for the first time, the question of whether a closer contact with Japan could be established in some form or other. I replied that I personally had certain connections with Japanese persons and would establish contact. When I did so it came to light that Japan had the same anti-Comintern attitude as Germany. Out of these conversations of the years 1933, 1934, 1935, I believe, the idea gradually crystallized that one might make these common efforts the subject of a pact. I believe it was one of my assistants who had the idea of concluding the Anti- Comintern Pact. I presented this idea to the Fuhrer and the Fuhrer approved of it. However, since it was, so to speak, an ideological question, he did not wish at that time that it be done through the official channels of German politics and therefore he instructed me to prepare this pact which then was concluded in my office in Berlin, as I believe, in the course of the year 1936.

Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal. 10. Nuremberg: International Military Tribunal. 1947. p. 240.

One of Ōshima's old associates from the time of the Weimar Republic, Friedrich Wilhelm Hack [de], had by 1934 joined the new Dienststelle Ribbentrop. Hack served as the networker between Ōshima, Canaris and German minister of defense Werner von Blomberg, organizing meetings in Freiburg, starting in early 1935.[39]: 240  Hack was instrumental in establishing personal contacts for Ōshima and was the most important link between Ōshima and Joachim von Ribbentrop, whom Ōshima viewed as the single most important person on the German side after Hitler himself. Ōshima first met with Ribbentrop in March 1935.[15]: 317–318  Ribbentrop reported to Hitler, according to his (Ribbentrop's) testimony at Nuremberg, that he 'personally had certain connections with Japanese persons'.[39]: 240  Historian Carl Boyd interprets this as a reference to the contact with Ōshima established via Hack.[11]: 58  With Hitler's tentative approval (Hitler was uncertain of Ōshima's authority and wanted Ribbentrop to ascertain the opinions of the higher-ups in the Japanese military establishment), negotiations between Ōshima and Ribbentrop went into full swing in fall of 1935.[15]: 318 

Negotiations

1935

Starting with the meetings in October, which at some point involved Hitler himself, Ōshima presented his idea of a promise of mutual assistance in case of an attack on one of the two countries by the Soviet Union.[11]: 59  At this point, Ōshima's telegrams to the Japanese army were enthusiastic about the diplomatic potential of the negotiations, up to and including the possibility of an open German-Japanese military alliance, even though both sides were more immediately comfortable at that point with a less impactful agreement to not aid the Soviet Union in case of a Soviet war against the other party. Such a 'no aid'-agreement was easier to fit into each country's respective grand strategies.[15]: 319  Ōshima's extensive involvement was essential to the formation of the Anti-Comintern Pact, but was also the source of some discomfort among the Japanese military and diplomatic leaderships, as Ōshima had far overextended his military assignment with his unauthorized diplomatic cooperation with Ribbentrop and even Hitler himself. But instead of the severe punishment that a junior officer like Ōshima might have otherwise received for his reckless dealings with a foreign head of government, Ōshima's advance was acknowledged positively by the Japanese hyper-militarists, who were sympathetic to Hitler's policies and impressed by Ōshima's successes.[11]: 60 

In late October 1935, the chief of the Japanese army's general staff, Prince Kan'in Kotohito, signalled that the army was positively disposed towards a pact with Germany.[11]: 60  Kotohito had been a close associate of Hiroshi Ōshima's father Ken'ichi Ōshima, Japan's Minister of the Army in 1916–1918, and was thus positively predisposed towards Hiroshi Ōshima's activity in Europe, and likely one of Ōshima's protectors in the question of Ōshima overstepping his initial assignments.[15]: 313 

Kotohito assigned a general staff intelligence officer, Tadaichi Wakamatsu, with a mission in Berlin that involved ascertaining the German attitude towards a German-Japanese agreement directed against the Soviet Union. Meetings between Wakamatsu, Ōshima and Blomberg in November and December 1935 achieved little,[11]: 61  although Wakamatsu signalled the general willingness of the Japanese army to negotiate a treaty with Germany.[14]: 19  He was sceptical of the Dienststelle's semi-official status within the German foreign service.

However, the IJA in principle remained open to the idea, and Wakamatsu left Germany for Japan in December 1935 with the understanding that both sides would seek government approval for the pact.[11]: 61  Wakamatsu and Kotohito were overall unprepared to deal with the remarkable progress that Ōshima reported in his messages and the potential magnitude of the resulting German-Japanese treaty.[15]: 319–320 

Near the end of 1935, Soviet Red Army intelligence intercepted several secret telegrams between Ōshima and the Japanese General Staff. This information was forwarded to the Soviet embassy in Japan, from which the American embassy also heard news of the ongoing secret negotiations between Germany and Japan. This marked the first time that the Soviet Union is confirmed to have received word of the ongoing negotiations of the Anti-Comintern Pact.[19]: 37–39 

1936

The inconsistencies between the German foreign ministry and Dienststelle Ribbentrop showed themselves again in the course of the negotiations. Dirksen, ambassador in Tokyo, was informed about the ongoing talks not by the German foreign service, but instead by the Japanese General Staff. German foreign minister Konstantin von Neurath, when informed about the situation by Hitler, argued against the creation of a German-Japanese pact. Firstly, he was concerned with Sino-German relations and thought Japan less important to Germany than China, and secondly, he wanted to avoid having foreign policy authority slip away from the foreign ministry towards Dienststelle Ribbentrop, where he saw Ribbentrop as a rival to his own position. In Japan, the matter was stalled, as the important documents got lost between January and February 1936 in the bureaucratic apparatus of the Japanese foreign ministry, as they were discarded by low-ranking officials before reaching foreign minister Kōki Hirota or his deputy Mamoru Shigemitsu.[11]: 62 

Only in March 1936, following the turmoil in Japan related to the failed military coup of February 26 and the German Remilitarization of the Rhineland did the matter reach the new foreign minister Hachirō Arita, who discussed it with the ambassador to Germany Mushanokōji, who was in Japan at that time, and several high-ranking army officials. In that meeting,[c] Chief of Military Affairs Ryoki Machijiri was the only one in favor of an outright military alliance between Germany and Japan, whereas Arita, Shigemitsu, Hisaichi Terauchi and Mushanokōji favored the more careful way of an agreement specifically aimed against the Comintern. However, they overestimated their own authority in Berlin, where Ōshima was still the main negotiation partner for the Germans and personally unwilling to give up any of his newfound diplomatic importance to officials of the foreign ministry. To prevent a clash with the Japanese army, of which Ōshima as a military attaché was technically the subordinate of, rather than the foreign ministry, Arita and Mushanokōji had to carefully weave a new position. While favoring the Anti-Comintern version of the agreement, they still gave Ōshima as a representative of the military the ability to negotiate a full alliance. Mushanokōji was instructed to take a passive stance towards the Germans and let them initiate negotiations, as to not appear as if the Japanese foreign ministry was making a leap forward.[11]: 62–64 

On the German side, the Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 27 March 1936 increased the demand for a strong partner in the Soviet Union's rear to prevent complete encirclement. Furthermore, Hitler hoped that France's allegiance to the Soviet Union might drive the anti-communist British government into a deal with Germany if Germany only made a strong enough gesture against communism. As such, negotiations resumed on 23 October 1936 and the pact was finalized and signed on 25 November of the same year.[31]: 342–346  The treaty between France and the USSR, as well as the increased cooperation between communists and socialists that had resulted from the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern, allowed the communist PCF to double its votes in the 1936 elections in France. With infighting on the political left in Europe reduced, it became more urgent for the German government to reassess its position.[30]: 595  On the same day that Ribbentrop and Mushanokōji initialed a draft agreement (23 October), Neurath signed a secret nine-point protocol with his Italian counterpart, Galeazzo Ciano.[40]: 1138 

However, the German diplomatic ambivalence between the ideological proximity and military potential of Japan and the economic value of China continued, and Neurath remained in favor of German alignment with China. In April 1936, Germany signed a major commercial treaty with China and gave them a credit of 100,000,000 marks for China to purchase German industrial and other products. It was Hitler himself who, unbeknownst to Neurath and the foreign ministry, began to reassess the importance of China and Japan in German foreign relations over the course of the summer of 1936. Hitler sanctioned new negotiations with the Japanese.[13]: 262–263 

Later that year, when German military attaché in Tokyo Eugen Ott temporarily returned to Germany to attend army maneuvers, he expressed his optimism about the Japanese army's willingness to conclude the pact to Hitler.[14]: 22 

Terauchi in May 1936 informed Ōshima that the army was yielding control of the negotiations to the foreign ministry in order to restore harmony between the two factions, but unofficially, Ōshima would remain Japan's key negotiator and Mushanokōji's role would be more ceremonial. In July, Mushanokōji requested a draft of the proposed treaty from Dienststelle Ribbentrop, which was drawn up by one of the Dienststelle's East Asian specialists, Dr. Hermann von Raumer. But instead of taking this draft immediately to Mushanokōji, Raumer, who probably acted on Ribbentrop's instructions, first presented it to Ōshima, who was attending the Bayreuth Festival at the time. On 22 July, Ōshima, Ribbentrop, Raumer and Hitler met in Bayreuth, where Hitler made some personal edits to Raumer's draft. Only then was the draft shown to ambassador Mushanokōji.[11]: 65–66 [15]: 321 

Japanese objections and final adjustments

This initial draft signed off on by Hitler appears to be lost to history, as the Japanese ambassador made some changes to it that were intended, according to Shigenori Tōgō's testimony at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, to make it less 'propagandistic' and more 'business-like'. Tōgō, acting on behalf of Arita, who was once again Japanese foreign minister, wanted to scrap all of Hitler's envisioned military provisions. Because Hitler's draft was lost, it is impossible to say what these were, but from the context, it seems likely that they were both a defensive as well as an offensive alliance against the Soviet Union, because Tōgō, when he was unable to have all military provisions scrapped outright, instead took the position that any such provisions should be purely defensive, implying that they were offensive as well at some point.[11]: 65–67 

Japanese government decision on the Anti-Comintern Pact, 24 July 1936, excerpt

The Anti-Comintern Pact itself should be limited in its phraseology and should refer only to an exchange of information against the subversive activities of the Comintern. To include more than the foregoing in the pact would anger and alarm the Soviet Union unnecessarily and would provide other countries with an opportunity for engaging in propaganda activities against us.

[...]

Japanese-German collaboration must not be a cause of anxiety to any other powers, especially Britain. Anglo-Japanese relations are not friendly at present because of the China question and certain economic issues that cannot be adjusted as yet, but one of the keynotes of our foreign policy must be to improve our relations with Britain, which has substantial influence with other world powers, and we must at the very least avoid a face-to-face confrontation with it at all costs.

Ohata, Tokushiro (1976). "The Anti-Comintern Pact, 1935–1939". In Morley, James William (ed.). "Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany and the USSR, 1935–1940". p. 32 & 39. ISBN 9780231089692.

On 24 July 1936, the Japanese government after some deliberation formally requested that the Anti-Comintern Pact should be limited only to an intelligence and information exchange as to avoid unnecessary diplomatic complications with the Soviet Union. The Japanese government also specifically requested to avoid any direct alliance and to instead only require consultation in case of attack, even in the secret protocol. Furthermore, the Japanese government requested clarification to make any obligation in case of a war of one of the parties against the Soviet Union specifically defensive (to avoid being drawn into a German offensive war against the USSR at an inopportune time), and to avoid specifically naming the Soviet Union in the treaty, even in the secret protocol. The first two requests made their way into the final version of the Anti-Comintern Pact, but the third did not. The Soviet Union's name was only avoided in the public parts of the treaty, and the secret protocol of the finalized Anti-Comintern Pact still specifically referred to the USSR.[19]: 32–33 

Additionally, the Japanese government also requested clarification on the prohibition on bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union without former consent, fearing that the wording of the treaty would allow Germany to maintain existing bilateral treaties with the USSR, including the Treaty of Rapallo (1922) and the Treaty of Berlin (1926). Specifically the latter treaty, which was a German-Soviet neutrality pact that had been upheld even by the anti-communist Nazis, was viewed in Japan as contradictory to the proposed terms of the Anti-Comintern Pact. The German government viewed the Anti-Comintern Pact as sufficient to override the terms of the Treaty of Berlin, and the Japanese government was satisfied with this explanation as long as it was attached to the treaty as a secret appendix.[19]: 32–33 

The Japanese government in its internal memoranda also stressed the vital necessity to avoid a deterioration of Anglo-Japanese relations as a result of the pact. There was a hope in Japan that the Anti-Comintern Pact could appeal to anti-communist circles in the United Kingdom and mend the two countries' relationship. After the pact's conclusion, this would prove to be a miscalculation.[19]: 39–41 

Ōshima, in a final act of insubordination to the foreign ministry, suggested to Hitler that the foreign ministry's objections could be salvaged if the anti-Soviet clauses of the treaty were added to the agreement in secret. Eventually, the foreign ministry yielded to the army's pressure, and agreed to a secret military addendum to the pact. On 16 August 1936, Ribbentrop informed Hitler that negotiations with ambassador Mushanokōji and with Ōshima had resulted in the ambassador's declaration that the Japanese government was willing in principle to approve the agreement.[14]: 27–29 [15]: 322  In a note to Hitler, Ribbentrop commented on the Japanese government's aversion to and the Japanese army's support for publication of the treaty .[41]: 836 

However, some minor adjustments were still made between August and October, when the pact was formally initialed. Its length was reduced to 5 years, down from 10 as had originally been planned. And, against Ōshima's and Hitler's hopes, the military leadership in Japan insisted that the military provisions could be only defensive and not offensive, even if agreed upon in a secret addendum. The military leadership was concerned that, if Japan was caught in a war against China, an offensive clause to the treaty would diplomatically force Japan into a war against the Soviet Union that it was militarily unwilling to fight. As a result, the first article of the secret additional protocol spoke specifically of "unprovoked attack" by the Soviet Union and had no offensive provisions.[11]: 65–67 

On the other hand, the Japanese side was unable to gain the upper hand on the topic of the pact's publication, which was advocated for by the Germans and which Japan had attempted to avoid. Furthermore, the secret protocol remained explicitly aimed at the Soviet Union, something that the Japanese had felt was an ineffective provision.[14]: 27–29 

The treaty draft was finalized on 23 October 1936.[19]: 35 

Approval by the Japanese Privy Council and by Adolf Hitler

The Anti-Comintern Pact required the approval of the Privy Council of Japan to allow Japanese accession to the treaty. Prime Minister Hirota had expressed his personal relief upon hearing the treaty draft's conclusion on 23 October 1936, and compared the achievement of the IJA in its advancement of the Anti-Comintern Pact to the IJN's success in forging the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The elder Japanese statesman Saionji Kinmochi, last of the genrō, had disagreed with the Japanese government's diplomatic step and denounced the Anti-Comintern Pact as exclusively useful to Germany and as without benefit for Japan. Kinmochi instead would have preferred a diplomatic course more in line with Japanese public opinion and geography, both of which made a positive relationship with UK and USA desirable. However, Kinmochi's critical stance remained unheard in the Privy Council.[19]: 35 

In the view of the proponents of the treaty within Japan, spearheaded by the IJA, Japan was militarily threatened by the Soviet Union's meddling in China, just as Germany was threatened by Soviet support for France and Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, both countries feared subversion by communist forces. This, as a result, made Germany and Japan natural allies against the Soviet Union and the Comintern. The opponents, who gathered around the IJN, cited the likelihood that the Anti-Comintern Pact would increase rather than decrease the threat posed by the USSR and that there would be considerable domestic resistance against the agreement. Ultimately, the supporters won out in the discussions that took place on 13 November and 18 November,[19]: 35  and the Privy Council gave the treaty its unanimous support on 25 November 1936.[14]: 25 

On the German side, all that was required for German accession to the pact was Hitler's approval, which was given quickly, and subsequently supported by a wave of anti-communist propaganda in the state-controlled German press.[14]: 25 

Signing

The treaty, which outlined a joint German and Japanese policy to counteract the activities of the Communist Internationale, was initially to be in force for five years, until November 1941.[2]: 333  Two additional protocols were signed, one of which was public. The other, which was specifically aimed against the Soviet Union, was secret. The treaty was signed in the offices of Dienststelle Ribbentrop rather than the German foreign ministry.[14]: 25  Ribbentrop, in his Nuremberg testimony, attributed this to Hitler's desire to avoid the usage of official channels of German politics for what Ribbentrop referred to as an "ideological question" rather than a political one.[39]: 240 

Texts of the Anti-Comintern Pact and its protocols

Main agreement

The German-Japanese Agreement against the Communist International [25 Nov 1936]

The Govemment of the German Reich and the Imperial Japanese Govemment, recognizing that the aim of the Communist International, known as the Comintern, is to disintegrate and subdue existing States by all means at its command; convinced that the toleration of interference by the Communist International in the internal affairs of the nationsnot only endangers their internal peace and social well being, but is also a menace to the peace of the world; desirous of cooperating in the defence against Communist subversion; have agreed as follows

Article 1: The High Contracting States agree to inform one another of the activities of the Communist International, to consult with one another on the necessary preventive measures and to carry these through in close collaboration.

Article 2: The High Contracting Parties will jointly invite third States whose intemal peace is threatened by the subversive activities of the Communist:Intemational to adopt defensive measures in the spirit of this agreement or to take part in the present agreement.

Article 3: The German as well as the Japanese text of the present agreement is to be deemed the original text. It comes into force on the day of signature and shall remain in force for a period of five years. Before the expiry of this period the High Contracting Parties will come to an understanding over the further methods of their cooperation.

Presseisen, Ernst L. (1958). Germany and Japan: A Study in Totalitarian Diplomacy 1933–1941. Den Haag: Springer-Science + Business Media. doi:10.1007/978-94-017-6590-9. ISBN 9789401765909. p. 327.

The full text was considered in its original form in both the German and Japanese versions, and the date was specified in both countries' versions as 25 November 1936 as well as 25 November in the 11th year of the Shōwa period. The agreement bears the signatures of German ambassador-at-large Ribbentrop and Japanese ambassador to Germany Mushanokōji. The initial length of the treaty was specified to be five years.[1]: 188–189 [35]: 328–329 [42] This reduced length was one of the concessions made after the objections of the Japanese foreign ministry to the initial Bayreuth draft of the treaty, in which the treaty was at first supposed to have a duration of ten years.[11]: 65–69 

In the first article of the treaty, Germany and Japan agreed to share information about Comintern activities and to plan their operations against such activities jointly. In the second article, the two parties opened the possibility of extending the pact to other countries "whose domestic peace is endangered by the disruptive activities of the Communist Internationale". Such invitations to third parties would be undertaken jointly and after the expressed consent by both parties. German state media referred to this provision of endangerment by Comintern disruption when, among other examples, the Völkischer Beobachter recounted various communist activities in Hungary and Manchukuo as the reason for the two countries to join the pact in February 1939.[43]

Protocol supplement

Supplementary Protocol [to the German-Japanese Agreement against the Communist International] [25 Nov 1936]

On the occasion of the signing today of the agreement against the Communist International, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have agreed as follows:

a) The competent authorities of the two High Contracting States will work in close collaboration in matters concerning the exchange of information over the activities of the Communist International as well as investigatory and defensive measures against the Communist International.

b) The competent authorities of the two High Contrading States will within the framework of the existing laws take severe measures against those who at home or abroad are engaged directly or indirectly in the service of the Communist International or promote its subversive activities.

c) In order to facilitate the cooperation of the competent authorities provided for in paragraph (a) a permanent committee will be set up. In this committee the further defensive measures necessary for the struggle against the subversive adivities of the Communist International will be considered and discussed.

Presseisen, Ernst L. (1958). Germany and Japan: A Study in Totalitarian Diplomacy 1933–1941. Den Haag: Springer-Science + Business Media. doi:10.1007/978-94-017-6590-9. ISBN 9789401765909. pp. 327–328.

A supplementary protocol was signed along with the agreement on the same day, 25 November 1936/Shōwa 11. Just like the main agreement, it bears the signatures of Ribbentrop and Mushanokōji.[1]: 188–189 [35]: 327–328 [44]

In the first article, German and Japan agreed to have their competent authorities "closely co-operate in the exchange of reports on the activities of [...] and on measures of information and defense against" the Comintern. The two contracting parties also agreed, in the second article, to have their competent authorities "within the framework of the existing law [...] take stringent measures against those who at home or abroad work on direct or indirect duty" of the Comintern.[44]

Secret additional protocol

Text of the Secret Additional Protocol to the German-Japanese Agreement [25 Nov 1936]

The Government of the German Reich and the Imperial Japanese Government, recognizing that the Government of the U.S.S.R. is working toward a realization of the aims of the Communist International and intends to employ its army for this purpose; convinced that this fact threatens not only the existence of the High Contrading States, but endangers world peace most seriously; in order to safeguard their common interests have agreed as follows:

Article 1: Should one of the High Contrading States become the object of an unprovoked attack or threat of attack by the U.S.S.R., the other High Contrading State obligates itself to take no measures which would tend to ease the situation of the U.S.S.R. Should the case described in paragraph 1 occur, the High Contrading States will immediately consult on what measures to take to safeguard their common interests.

Article 2: For the duration of the present agreement the High Contrading States will conclude no political treaties with the U.S.S.R. contrary to the spirit of this agreement without mutual consent.

Article 3: The German as well as the Japanese text of the present agreement is to be deemed the original text. The agreement comes into force simultaneously with the agreement against the Communist International signed today and will remain in force for the same period.

Presseisen, Ernst L. (1958). Germany and Japan: A Study in Totalitarian Diplomacy 1933–1941. Den Haag: Springer-Science + Business Media. doi:10.1007/978-94-017-6590-9. ISBN 9789401765909. p. 328.

In addition to the main treaty and the public additional protocol ("Protocol Supplement"), there was also another additional protocol on 25 November 1936/Shōwa 11, this one kept in strict secrecy from the public, which specifically dealt with the establishment of Germany's and Japan's military and diplomatic partnership against the Soviet Union. While the Soviet Union was alluded to with the public protocol's references to Comintern activity, the secret additional protocol is the only one where the USSR is actually mentioned by name. Just like the main agreement and the public additional protocol, the secret additional protocol was signed by Ribbentrop and Mushanokōji.[35]: 327–328 [4]: 200 

The latter protocol's secrecy was agreed upon in a separate document signed by both Ribbentrop and Mushanokōji, in which the two states created the option to inform third parties about the contents of the secret agreement with mutual consent. Ambassador Mushanokōji informed Japanese foreign minister Hachirō Arita of the successful conclusion of negotiations later on in the day.[4]: 200–201 

The secret additional protocol reveals the true intention of the Anti-Comintern Pact. Rather than a vague ideological crackdown on the alleged overreach of communist activists, it was a specific defensive alliance direct particularly against the Soviet Union as a country.[45]: 52 [3]: 22 

Due to its covert nature, the secret additional protocol remained exclusive between Germany and Japan, whereas other countries joined only the two public clauses of the treaty. Starting with Italy, the other countries of the Anti-Comintern Pact did not sign the secret additional protocol.[18]: 641 

Reactions

To the international community, the Anti-Comintern Pact signalled the beginning of the German-Japanese partnership,[3]: 22  as it marked the first formal alliance between the two countries.[46]: 368 

China

The Anti-Comintern Pact between Germany and Japan was a direct threat to China, which relied on German military assistance against the threat of the imminent Japanese invasion. The German foreign ministry, which had been opposed to Dienststelle Ribbentrop's alignment with Japan, made significant efforts to reassure China of German assistance. This lasted until the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and China in July 1937, after which Germany, keeping with Ribbentrop's agenda, aligned clearly with Japan,[18]: 640  including the German compliance with Japanese requests to recall the military mission of Alexander von Falkenhausen.[33]

France

In France, the Anti-Comintern Pact, especially after Italy's entry, was viewed as a German power grab in Eastern Europe, particularly to the detriment of Czechoslovakia and Poland.[47]: 50 

Germany

The German public was informed of the treaty's entry into legislation by the German Reichsgesetzblatt in 1937.[48] Ribbentrop justified the Anti-Comintern Pact as a joint German-Japanese act to defend western civilization.[12]: 299  The existence of the secret additional protocol and the treaty's anti-Soviet nature was denied in Nazi Germany even after the beginning of the German-Soviet War in 1941.[49]

The German government launched a pro-Japanese publicity campaign to improve the general opinion of the German public about Japan.[14]: 27  This was part of the German government's attempt to forge a tighter cultural relationship.[50]

Italy

The Italian government, which had still viewed Germany as a potential rival well into the year 1935, had initially abstained from the negotiations of the Anti-Comintern Pact.[37]: 115  But starting with the 1936 October Protocols, Germany and Italy had begun a diplomatic rapprochement against the backdrop of the Italian war in Ethiopia and the resulting failure of the Italian Stresa Front with the UK and France. Still, Italy was keen to, at least initially, avoid the implication that it would soon adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact itself, even though Ribbentrop heavily implied that "Italy will hoist the anti-Bolshevist banner in the south" soon after the pact's creation. Hitler shared that same impression.[14]: 27  Italy would end up joining the pact in November 1937.[51]: 257 [12]: 353 

Japan

The Japanese public as a whole did not receive the Anti-Comintern Pact with any particular enthusiasm.[14]: 27 [52]: 359–360  In the aftermath of the agreement, the influx of national socialist ideology into Japanese society after the alignment with Germany caused an increase in antisemitism in Japan.[21]: 280–281  The Japanese press, less restricted than its German counterpart, was even partially critical of the pact's apparently sudden and rushed conclusion (the negotiations had been kept in strict secrecy from the public until the pact's publication), and there were doubts in the newspapers' opinion pieces about the willingness of Germany to sacrifice its soldiers in the case of a war between Japan and the Soviet Union.[14]: 28 

In Tokyo, the government was reluctant to attract any unwanted international antagonists, while it remained focussed on its aims in mainland China. As such, the government had been initially cautious, reluctant to cause a diplomatic incident with the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, but eventually saw itself driven into the treaty when the Soviet Union signed a mutual assistance treaty with the Mongolian People's Republic in April 1936.[53][18]: 639  However, despite the government's scepticism, the Privy Council had given its unanimous consent.[14]: 25 [11]: 67–69 

As a result of the Anti-Comintern Pact, the military influence within the government was strengthened.[11]: 69–71  The Japanese government, in response to the upsurge of antisemitism that resulted from the influx of European-style national socialist ideology into Japanese society, began using antisemitic imagery in its media campaigns, particularly those directed against western-style capitalism.[21]: 280–281  Prime Minister Hirota called Germany Japan's foremost diplomatic partner after the treaty, but stressed that the Anti-Comintern Pact did not imply ideological support for Germany's domestic policy.[19]: 36 

The IJA, which traditionally was an admirer and imitator of German military systems, which employed hundreds of German military experts and advisors by the 1920s,[15]: 311  and sent Japanese army hopefuls to Germany for study,[54]: 122  was the treaty's main proponent. Prince Kotohito had signalled the army's positive predisposition towards Ōshima's efforts in Berlin.[11]: 60  The IJA was closely aligned with its German counterpart and a strong proponent of a joint Japanese-German action against the Soviet Union.[21]: 308 

The IJN, by contrast, was among the treaty's greatest critics. While the IJN officer class was not necessarily denouncing the pact,[52]: 359–360  its usefulness was seen as very limited. The IJN view of the naval situation was one where Japan had an inferior naval force to that of the United Kingdom and the United States, both of whom were furthermore inclined to cooperate with each other to counteract the Japanese presence if necessary. By contrast, Germany (and later Italy) would be of almost no help to alleviate an Anglo-American naval blockade or aid the Japanese naval efforts in the Pacific.[55]: 140–141  The Japanese navy would have preferred to avoid the treaty if that meant a better relationship with the United States and the United Kingdom as a result.[18]: 639 

Soviet Union

Speech of Maxim Litvinov to the All-Union Congress, 26 November 1936

Well-informed people refuse to believe that for the drawing of the two scanty published articles of the German-Japanese agreement it was necessary to conduct negotiations for fifteen months, and that on the Japanese side it was necessary to entrust these negotiations to an Army general, and on the German side to an important diplomat, and that it was necessary to conduct these negotiations in an atmosphere of the strictest secrecy. As regards the published [...] agreement, it is only a camouflage for another agreement which was simultaneously discussed and initially [...] in which the word 'Communism' is not even mentioned.

Stratman, George John (1970). "The Anti-Comintern Pact 1933–1936". Germany's diplomatic relations with Japan 1933–1941. Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 2450. University of Montana. p. 26.

Publicly, the Soviet government attempted to downplay the significance of the pact.[29]: 121  However the Anti-Comintern Pact was seen internally as a clear sign of an attempted encirclement by Germany and Japan.[3]: 226  In a political note to the Hungarian government in January 1939, Soviet foreign minister Maxim Litvinov called the Anti-Comintern Pact a "political instrument mainly in the hands of the Japanese, who had hostile intentions against the Soviet Union".[56]: 301  Litvinov had also, in speaking to the All-Union Congress of Soviets on 26 November, cast doubt on the completeness of the treaty as presented to the public, declaring it to be "only a camouflage for another agreement which was simultaneously discussed".[14]: 26 [19]: 38 

Soviet diplomats quickly came to the same opinion that had been implied by Litvinov on 26 November: the Anti-Comintern Pact was specifically directed against the USSR. Soviet ambassador in Tokyo Konstantin Yurenev believed (correctly) that the pact, behind its facade, contained military provisions against the Soviet Union.[57]: 488–489  Yurenev had even contacted Japanese foreign minister Arita before the pact's publication, on 16 November and 20 November. While Arita had on the first request dodged the issue by pointing to the fact that the negotiations were only concerned with the Comintern and not the Soviet Union, he did not respond to the latter contact by Yurenev, in which the ambassador accused the Japanese foreign service of holding secret negotiations with Germany specifically aimed against the USSR.[19]: 38 

The Anti-Comintern Pact politically accelerated the downward trend of the Soviet Union's trade relations with Japan. Alarmed by the Anti-Comintern Pact, the USSR had cut down sales to and purchases from Japan: in 1939, Japanese imports from European Russia were the lowest since 1914 and exports to European Russia the lowest since 1926, whereas Japanese imports from Asiatic Russia were the lowest since 1887 and exports to Asiatic Russia the lowest since 1914. The Anti-Comintern Pact's restrictive policy towards bilateral treaties between Japan and the USSR without German consent made this downward spiral hard to fix. Only after the German-Soviet Pact of 1939 and the subsequent decrease of Japanese trust in Germany did the mutual political and economic attitude improve.[58]

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom also saw its colonial empire in Asia and eventually Africa threatened by the Japanese and later also the Italian alliance with Germany.[59]: 30  This view was not completely unjustified in the context of the Axis Powers' navies, as the naval high commands of Germany, Italy and Japan mainly aimed their common considerations against the United Kingdom, not the Soviet Union.[7]: 39–40  In the House of Commons, the Anti-Comintern Pact became a subject of debate multiple times.[d] The British armed forces were concerned about a potential military conflict with Germany and Japan, and this feeling was escalated upon Italian accession to the agreement.[36]: 177–178 

United States

In the United States, the German-Japanese agreement was viewed as an indication that Germany might follow Japan's path of satisfying territorial claims with military action, as Japan had done in Manchuria in 1931. In a September 1937 report to the Treasury (after the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War), it was argued that the long-term consequence of a Japanese victory in China would result in other "dissatisfied" powers, such as Germany and Italy, seeking the fulfillment of their objectives in military endeavors of their own. The American armed forces were concerned about the prospect of Japan gaining military allies in the form of Germany and later Italy, as that posed a potential threat to the American War Plan Orange.[47]: 34–36 

In 1937, American ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew analyzed the Anti-Comintern Pact's anti-communist rhetoric as a mere banner for "have-not" countries to unite under while in truth aiming primarily against the British Empire's global dominance.[6]: 268 

Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.S. President from 1933 to 1945, shared French concerns about the safety of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Roosevelt believed that the pact contained secret clauses outlining an alliance that was both defensive and offensive, and that it divided the world into spheres of influence for each of the signatories.[47]: 50  Eventually, the USS Panay incident of 1937 resulted in the President's attempt to break the Anti-Comintern Pact by appeasing Germany and Italy with the goal of isolating Japan from its allies to hinder its progress in China.[47]: 62 

Cordell Hull noted in his memoirs that "[n]othing could have been more logical and natural than an alliance of Berlin and Tokyo", citing shared values of militarism, conquest and disregard for international treaties as the reason for his conclusion.[57]: 488–489 

Expansion and adaptations

The Anti-Comintern Pact's original provisions had included a specific provision that allowed Germany and Japan to jointly invite additional members into the pact.[35]: 327–328  In Japan, the Anti-Comintern Pact was seen as possibly groundbreaking in freeing the country from its international isolation and to acquire new diplomatic and military partners. Countries whose membership Japan was interested in included the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and especially Poland.[19]: 39–42 

Second Sino-Japanese War

The Anti-Comintern Pact between Germany and Japan met its first trial when Japan and China, both of whom were important partners with Germany, went to war. The Second Sino-Japanese War, provoked by the Japanese forces through the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, forced Germany to reassess the balance of its economic relationship with China and its ideological and military alignment with Japan. It was evident that Germany would have to abandon one of its partners in favor of the other, and made the decision to favor Japan over China, although Hitler himself had as late as 1936 personally still assured the Chinese ambassador that Germany would maintain the two countries' important relationship.[14]: 30–34 

While Germany's policy in regards to the war between Japan and China was one of strict neutrality,[60]: 599–600  it made no particular effort, diplomatic or otherwise, to stop the Japanese aggression against China. The German government and foreign service still remained privately critical of the Japanese course of action. When Japanese ambassador to Germany Mushanokōji explained to state secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker that the Japanese invasion of China kept in the spirit of the Anti-Comintern Pact in its attempt to vanquish Chinese communism, Weizsäcker dismissed Mushanokōji's explanation on the basis of the German view that the Japanese action would foster rather than stifle the growth of communism in China.[14]: 31–32  Weizsäcker, in his notes with regards to this conversation with Mushanokōji, expressed the fear that the Japanese aggression could lead directly to an alliance between the Soviet Union and China.[60]: 607–608 

Entry of Italy

Italian entry protocol (6 November 1937)

The Italian Government, the Government of the German Reich, the Imperial Government of Japan,

Considering that the Communist International continues constantly to endanger the civilised world in the West and the East, disturbing and destroying peace and order,

Convinced that only strict collaboration among all the States interested in the maintenance of peace and order, can limit and remove that danger,

Considering that Italy—who with the advent of the Fascist Regime has fought such a danger with inflexible determination and has eliminated the Communist International from her territory—has decided to range herself against the common enemy by the side of Germany and Japan, who for their parts are animated by the same will to defend themselves against the Communist International

Have, in accordance with Article 2 of the Agreement against the Communist International concluded at Berlin on 25th November, 1936, between Germany and Japan, agreed to the following:

Article 1: Italy participates in (entra a far parte) the Agreement against the Communist International and in the supplementary Protocol concluded on 25th November, 1936, between Germany and Japan, the text of which is quoted in the annex to the present Protocol.

Article 2: The three signatory Powers of the present Protocol agree that Italy shall be considered as an original signatory of the Agreement and of the supplementary Protocol mentioned in the preceding Article, the signature of the present Protocol being equivalent to the signature of the original text of the aforesaid Agreement and supplementary Protocol.

Article 3: The present Protocol will constitute an integral part of the above mentioned Agreement and supplementary Protocol.

Article 4: The present Protocol is drawn up in Italian, Japanese and German, each text being considered as authentic. It will enter into force on the day of the signature.

In faith of which the undersigned, duly authorised by their respective Governments, have signed the present Protocol and have attached their seals thereto.

Made in triplicate at Rome, the 6th November, 1937: Year 16 of the Fascist Era, which corresponds to 6th November of the 12th year of Showa.

Hansard Debates, Volume 327, 10 November 1937, hansard.parliament.uk, retrieved on 27 Sep 2019

On 6 November 1937, Italy joined the Anti-Comintern Pact.[12]: 353  Italy's decision was a reaction to the failure of the Stresa Front, the Franco-British initiative of 1935 designed to keep Germany from extending beyond its present borders. In particular, both nations tried to block "German expansionism", especially the annexation of Austria, which the fascist government in Rome also wanted to prevent at that time.

Distrustful relations and Benito Mussolini's own expansionism furthered the distance between Italy and the two Allied Powers. Italy invaded Ethiopia in October 1935, in an act of unprovoked aggression that was a breach of the League of Nations policy. Although the attempted Hoare–Laval Pact, designed by its British and French drafters to allow Italy to retain most of its war goals and to maintain the Stresa Front, had failed to gain support, the League of Nations had discredited itself. After the League eventually punished Italian expansionism with economic sanctions, this broke the Stresa Front and resulted in the necessity for Italy to search for a new partner. As a result, Italy was diplomatically driven away from the Stresa Front with the Allies and towards the Pact of Steel with Germany. Italy's accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact completed the diplomatic triangle between Germany, Italy and Japan later formalized in the Tripartite Pact that was colloquially known as the Axis Powers, inspired by the term used by Benito Mussolini in reference to the German-Italian relationship on 1 November 1936.[2]: 761 

Italy's accession into the pact was a trade-off, in which Mussolini agreed to Hitler's goals of Austrian annexation.[12]: 353  Italy had been invited to the pact as early as the original German-Japanese agreement in November 1936, but was at the time uninterested in the largely symbolic gesture, as the Italian government believed that its anti-communist attitude was sufficiently represented by the Italian presence in the Spanish Civil War.[37]: 115  Italian membership had been considered by Ribbentrop during the earliest drafting stages of the agreement in October 1935.[31]: 342–346  German-Italian rapprochement did not fully begin until October 1936, when the Anti-Comintern Pact between Germany and Japan was already nearing its enactment.[20]: 146 

Galeazzo Ciano, Italy's foreign minister, was apprehensive about the potential loss of influence for Italy in South East Europe that a close alignment with Germany and the subsequent German entry into the Balkans would entail. The Italian stance towards a Third Europe or Horizontal Axis, the idea of a power bloc in Eastern Europe that rejected both German and Soviet influence, was not necessarily negative. It was this ambivalence in Italian foreign policy that initially hindered a full Italian alignment with Germany.[61]: 742 

By 1937, the Italian interest in the pact had changed, as the Mussolini administration desired to have its own military alliance with Japan and felt that accession to the agreement would be the easiest way to forge the triangular alliance with Germany and Japan that the Italian government desired.[37]: 152  Ciano commented in his diary on 2 November 1937 that the pact, while anti-communist in name, was instead "clearly anti-British". The protocol of Italy's entry was signed on 6 November 1937.[5]: 44 

It should be pointed out that, as a result of the phrasing of the treaty, Italy was, from a purely legal argument, required to only adhere to the main text and the public supplementary protocol, but not to the secret protocol that had the specific military directives against the Soviet Union.[18]: 641 

In reaction to the Italian accession to the pact, the British government saw the traditional British dominance in the Mediterranean (Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, and Egypt (Suez Canal)) threatened by a potentially resurgent Italy backed with German industrial and military power. Robert Vansittart, a prominent critic of the British Appeasement policy under Neville Chamberlain, warned that Italy, with its recent acquisitions in the war against Ethiopia, threatened a pincer movement against Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and that Mussolini, due to his personality, could not be deterred even by Italy's economic instability from a potential military adventure against the United Kingdom.[36]: 177–178 

Attempts to develop the pact into a military alliance

After the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact and especially after Italy's entry, Ribbentrop continued his efforts to form it into a full military alliance.[16]: 268  This mirrored the thoughts of Ribbentrop, Raumer, Ōshima and Hitler during the treaty's creation, as the original draft that Hitler signed off on in Bayreuth had likely included military terms that were explicitly both defensive as well as offensive. This was prevented by the intervention of Japanese diplomats around Shigenori Tōgō.[11]: 66–67 

After the pact's conclusion, Ribbentrop's efforts to transform it into a military alliance continued, although his agenda was driven by the concern with war against the western allies, whereas Hitler's main primary concern had been to eliminate the Soviet Union. Ribbentrop in his function as German ambassador to the United Kingdom recommended to Hitler in his report of 28 December 1937 and his final conclusions of 2 January 1938 the creation of a strong anti-British alliance with the ability to threaten the United Kingdom in a way that would either compel it to stay neutral or in the case of war be able to defeat it.[16]: 268 

Ribbentrop's political power within the German foreign service grew massively when he was named foreign minister as a replacement for Konstantin von Neurath on 4 February 1938. This was part of the reshuffle of army, air force and foreign service caused by the dismissal of Werner von Blomberg and Werner von Fritsch.[62]: 285  In this military-political purge, Hitler removed twelve generals (not counting Blomberg and Fritsch) and reassigned 51 other military posts.[27]: 58  The removal of Neurath, Fritsch and Blomberg marked the elimination of large parts of the 'moderate' faction in the cabinet Hitler, where as the 'extremists' remained: Goebbels, Hess, Rosenberg and Ribbentrop.[47]: 5 

The May Crisis of 1938, when there was a perception of aggressive German troop movements against Czechoslovakia, brought with it strong diplomatic reactions from France and Britain that went contrary to the established Appeasement policy. As a result, Ribbentrop renewed his pressure on Hitler to formalize the Anti-Comintern Pact into a full military alliance for the case of war against the United Kingdom and France. He eventually also gained the support of Bernardo Attolico, Italian ambassador to Germany, for the idea.[16]: 270–272 

In early January 1939, Ribbentrop was certain of his progress in transforming the pact into an alliance.[63]: 3  Mussolini, who had by now given up his attempts at Italian diplomatic ambivalence between the United Kingdom and Germany and fully committed to Italian alliance with Germany,[16]: 273  gave his agreement as well.[63]: 3  Mussolini also advocated to even expand this prospective alliance to include Yugoslavia, Hungary and Romania.[16]: 273 

Signing of the Pact of Steel by Galeazzo Ciano for Italy and Joachim von Ribbentrop for Germany

Henceforth, from January 1939 onward, Italy and Germany cooperated on their draft of a military alliance, but Japan was cautious to commit. While the political lobby of the Japanese army was generally in favor of the conclusion of a military alliance with Germany, particularly in order to contain the Soviet Union, the Japanese navy continued to view the prospect of an alliance with Germany as of no particular use for Japan's naval strategic position and as a potential diplomatic and economic blunder, as Japan's navy alone would not be sufficient to hold off British and American naval forces if an alliance with Germany would lead Japan into war with either of the Anglo-American powers, thus cutting off Japan, dependent on vital shipping routes.[55]: 140–141 [64]: 135 

The overall Japanese attitude, still anti-Soviet rather than anti-British, did not fit with the German and Italian designs to openly antagonize the United Kingdom. The Japanese foreign service did not wish to be drawn into a war between the nations of Western Europe and as a result aimed to differentiate between the Axis Powers' designs against the UK and those against the USSR. Ribbentrop's designs were thus rejected by the Japanese delegates, who insisted on the Anti-Comintern Pact's initial anti-communist designs and were unwilling to see an anti-British component added to it.

Eventually, Japanese caution led Ribbentrop to settle for only a bilateral alliance rather than the trilateral one he had hoped for, and the Pact of Steel was signed between Germany and Italy on 22 May 1939.[16]: 274  The Pact of Steel's capabilities were commented on by Ciano as "real dynamite".[63]: 81–82  The Pact of Steel enabled Germany to proceed in its aggressive posturing against Poland, as this issue did not necessarily require Japanese consent or support, but Ribbentrop also desired to expand the Pact of Steel and include Japan in it. However, Japanese stalling tactics continued, and Germany wanted to eliminate the Soviet Union as a potential factor in its war against Poland.[16]: 274 

As a result, Ribbentrop started seriously pondering a quid pro quo with the USSR on the question of Eastern Europe's future. This would mark a complete betrayal of the Anti-Comintern Pact's provision to not make bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union without Japanese consent, but Germany proceeded nonetheless. In May 1939, Ribbentrop instructed Friedrich-Werner Graf von der Schulenburg to initiate a German-Soviet rapprochement on the basis that the newly forged Pact of Steel marked a turn in Germany's foreign policy, away from anti-Soviet towards anti-British and anti-French diplomacy. Ribbentrop also promised to redirect Japanese anti-Soviet foreign policy into a state where Japan and the USSR would no longer have to stand in rivalry.

At this stage, Ribbentrop also started envisioning a bloc of four, where the Soviet Union would be included with Germany, Italy and Japan to form a quadripartite faction against British influence. This marked a complete deviation from Nazi policy, particularly the Hitlerian goal of Lebensraum, and was one of the many iterations of Ribbentrop's all-encompassing foreign political goal of containing by all possible means the influence of the United Kingdom. This Euro-Asiatic bloc of four, as historian Wolfgang Michalka calls it, ultimately failed because of the differences between Germany, the Soviet Union and Japan. Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact in August 1939.[16]: 275–278 

Entry of Hungary and Manchukuo

Hungary joined the agreement on 24 February 1939.[2]: 49  It received the invitation to the pact on 13 January, after the Hungarian foreign minister István Csáky announced on 12 January that Hungary would accept an invitation if it were to receive one.[65]: 300  It was the first member with some independence outside of the big three, and it was subsequently the first country to be denied first-class status among the pact's members, thus establishing the division between Germany, Italy and Japan as the leading nations of the pact and the remaining countries as their subordinates.[66]: 671–672  This superior status of the three leading countries was later formalized in the extension of the pact on 25 November 1941.[65]: 708 

The pact proved unpopular in Hungary, particularly as Hungary's long-standing ally Poland became Germany's target.[67]: 211  In his memoirs, Hungary's strongman Miklós Horthy would later complain that Germany had unduly involved itself in Hungarian domestic affairs even before Hungary's accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact, and that German media had no place to insist that Hungary had a 'bill to pay' after profiting from German diplomatic intervention on her behalf during the First Vienna Award.[67]: 208  However, the German archives show that a clear quid pro quo had been made between Germany and Hungary: in exchange for the German support for Hungarian territorial expansion into southern Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine, Hungarian Prime Minister Kálmán Darányi specifically promised Hungary would leave the League of Nations and join the Anti-Comintern Pact.[56]: 274–275 

Another country that joined the pact on 24 February 1939 was the Japanese-established Empire of Manchukuo.[2]: 49  Manchukuo received the invitation on 16 January and the accession protocol was signed in Changchun on 24 February.[56]: 300 

The entry of Hungary and Manchukuo was celebrated by the German state-controlled Völkischer Beobachter as the growth of the front against bolshevism and the consolidation of a world order.[43]

Entry of Spain

Francisco Franco's Spain joined the pact on 27 March 1939, the same day that the surrender of the Spanish Republicans at the end of the Siege of Madrid brought about the end of the Spanish Civil War.[2]: 865  The accelerated addition of Spain to the Anti-Comintern Pact, with the goal to counteract British influence in Spain, had been pursued by German,[65]: 708  Italian[63]: 30–31 [65]: 707  and Japanese[65]: 704–705  politicians since at least January 1939. It was specified by German State Secretary Weizsäcker that the invitation to Spain should only come from Germany, Italy, and Japan, but not from Hungary.[65]: 708 

The Spanish side delayed the accession to the pact, as the Franco leadership feared intervention by the Allied powers on the Republican side should the Nationalists side with the Axis before the war's conclusion. Franco's foreign minister, Jordana, accordingly stalled Spain's entry into the Anti-Comintern Pact until the end of the Spanish Civil War.[65]: 709–714 

Spain's membership in the pact was proof of Spanish alignment with the European fascists, and the nationalist success in the Spanish Civil War became a justification for the Anti-Comintern Pact's continued activity and as a confirmation of the pact's value.[36]: 218 

In the British House of Commons, Spain's entry into the Anti-Comintern Pact was viewed with suspicion, particularly in regards to the safety of Gibraltar and by extension Malta, British Egypt and Mandatory Palestine.[68] The British government, after nationalist victory had become obvious, had attempted to quickly improve relations with the new government in Madrid, but the progress on Anglo-Spanish relations received a setback with the Spanish entry into the pact.

France, although nominally also interested in positive relations with the falangists as seen in the Bérard-Jordana Agreement of 25 February 1939, made even less headway than the British. After Spanish entry into the Anti-Comintern Pact, there was a Spanish military buildup in colonial Morocco, and the Franco government further worsened tensions by refusing to allow the re-entry of refugees that had fled the country in the closing days of the Spanish Civil War.[36]: 221 

Other considerations, 1938–1939

A candidate for membership in the eyes of the Axis Powers was the Second Polish Republic. Poland had cooperated with Germany on the occupations of Czechoslovak territory after the Munich Agreement and seemed like an approachable partner, but the German offers of a Polish membership in the pact were tied to a return of Danzig to Germany, something that Poland was unwilling to accept out of concern for its access to the sea and its policy of equal diplomatic distance between Germany and the Soviet Union.[12]: 455 [69]: 42 

In January 1939, the Axis Powers were courting the Stojadinović government in Yugoslavia to attempt to induce Yugoslavia to join the Anti-Comintern Pact.[63]: 13  The attempts failed when Stojadinović's government fell on 5 February 1939 and Stojadinović was replaced with Dragiša Cvetković as Prime Minister,[70]: 66  which came as a surprise to the Axis Powers, who had believed Stojadinović was secure in office.[63]: 22  While there were hopes among the Axis that Stojadinović might return to power,[63]: 32  this failed to materialize.[70]: 57–72 

In February 1939, the German military leadership, independent from the foreign ministry, increased the pressure on Bulgaria to join the Anti-Comintern Pact. Generalmajor Georg Thomas[e] explained to the Bulgarian delegation during negotiations regarding German armament loans to Bulgaria that such loans could only be extended if Bulgaria made a clear political showing of alignment to Germany in form of joining the Anti-Comintern Pact. Weizsäcker complained to the Wehrmacht high command about this incident.[56]: 333–334  Thomas subsequently claimed to Weizsäcker that he was acting on the direct orders of Hermann Göring.[56]: 334  In a subsequent conversation between the Bulgarian delegate and Weizsäcker, it was made clear that Bulgaria was not prepared to join the Anti-Comintern Pact at that time.[56]: 334  Bulgaria would not join the agreement until 25 November 1941.[2]: 49 

In the run up to the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in the rump territories of Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovak accession into the Anti-Comintern Pact was part of the numerous demands Hitler made on the Czechs as a pretext to justify the invasion after the inevitable non-compliance.[12]: 439 

Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact

The pact's legitimacy was undermined when Germany blatantly broke it by secretly negotiating the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact with the Soviet Union. During the negotiations between Ribbentrop and Stalin in Moscow in August 1939, just a few weeks before the outbreak of World War II, the Anti-Comintern Pact proved only a small obstacle. Ribbentrop explained to Stalin that, in fact, the Anti-Comintern Pact had been aimed against the western democracies, not the Soviet Union.

Stalin accepted this for the sake of his country's diplomatic goals, and there were jokes made among the German public that the Soviet Union would end up joining the Anti-Comintern Pact itself.[12]: 540  Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov had not made the Anti-Comintern Pact an issue during the negotiations with Ribbentrop and German ambassador to the Soviet Union Schulenburg.[71]: 82 

Reactions within the Anti-Comintern Pact

Italy

On the backdrop of the preparations for World War II, the Italian reaction to Germany's actions was ambivalent. The Italian population's pre-existing anti-German and anti-war sentiments were not helped at all by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact,[63]: 127, 135  but Mussolini's personal opinion was more divided. Mussolini, although sometimes of the opinion that neutrality was preferable,[63]: 117–119  felt compelled by personal loyalty,[63]: 120  fear of Hitler's disapproval,[63]: 123–124  as well as the prospect of easy war spoils,[63]: 120  that Italy should stand by Germany's side,[63]: 123–124  especially if an Allied act of appeasement in Poland could result in a swift Italian victory in Yugoslavia.[63]: 120–122  Italian involvement in the war was opposed by an anti-war faction in the Italian government around Ciano,[63]: 125–126  who attempted to prevent Italy's entry into World War II and to break the alliance between Germany and Italy,[63]: 120–121  to which Mussolini at times carefully agreed if a long enough time frame was given to dissolve the alliance.[63]: 121–122 

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact confirmed numerous suspicions that the Italian public, already unenthusiastic about any diplomatic alliance with Germany, had about the Germans. This diplomatic betrayal, combined with the eventual defeat of the Axis Powers in World War II, fuelled widespread germanophobia in Italian literature and popular culture in the immediate aftermath of World War II.[72]

Japan

In the Japanese view, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was a violation of the Anti-Comintern Pact, as Germany had not revealed its negotiations with the USSR to Japan. Subsequently, the Japanese sought to settle the Soviet-Japanese Border War and abandoned any territorial aspirations against the Soviet Union.[3]: 24  Japan had mainly intended the Anti-Comintern Pact to be directed against the Soviet Union rather than the United Kingdom, whereas the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact made it clear that the Germans, at least in 1939, were willing to aid the Soviets to the detriment of the western democracies.[7]: 40  In response to this drastic German change in foreign policy and the Japanese defeat at Soviet hands in the border conflicts, the Hiranuma administration resigned.[21]: 354 [64]: 135 

Japanese emperor Hirohito instructed the subsequent government, led by Nobuyuki Abe, to be more cooperative towards the United Kingdom and the United States.[21]: 354 

Ribbentrop attempted to win Japanese support for his bloc of four with Germany, Italy, Japan and the Soviet Union. The German foreign minister argued that if Tokyo and Moscow were to form a military coalition together with Berlin and Rome, Japan would be free to turn its attention to the potential acquisition of European colonies in South East Asia. However, the ideological barriers were too great for comfort for the Japanese leadership, and Ribbentrop failed to compel them into an alliance with the Soviet Union. He had also put himself forward as a negotiator between Japan and the USSR, but was once again cold-shouldered by both as they began to pragmatically wrap up their differences bilaterally and without German oversight. As a result of the diplomatic shakeup, Japan retreated out of Ribbentrop's anti-British designs. Ribbentrop's pro-Japanese diplomacy, which he had pursued in spite of the German foreign ministry's initial favorability towards China since 1934, was now met with the largest diplomatic distance between Germany and Japan since the Nazis' rise to power.[16]: 279 

In the aftermath of the Japanese change of attitude towards a war against the Soviet Union, Soviet-Japanese economic relations improved. Shikao Matsumisha of the Commercial Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Office and Soviet foreign minister Molotov signaled mutual interest in an improvement of Japanese-Soviet trade relations in October 1939. The two countries agreed to more permanently settle the ongoing question of Japanese fishing in Soviet waters and the payments for the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchukuo. The Soviet Union promised that significant amounts of the money received as part of these deals would be invested back into the purchase of Japanese goods.[58]

The Japanese intelligence agencies and foreign service, which had previously supported separatism among the Soviet Union's ethnic minorities, also restricted their activities in this field as a result of the Soviet-Japanese rapprochement.[73]

Starting with the German-Soviet War, the Japanese loss of interest in war with the USSR had the consequence that Japan was unwilling to open up a second front against the Soviet Union to relieve German efforts,[3]: 24  as Japan interpreted Germany's aggression as an insufficient reason to trigger the treaty.[38]: 245  As a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, there was a significant cooling of German-Japanese relations between late 1939 and the summer of 1940, but after Germany's victories in 1940, the elimination of the French and Dutch colonial powers caused Japan, interested in the acquisition of the colonies in question, to approach Germany again.[7]: 41 

During World War II

All further additions to the Anti-Comintern Pact were after 1 September 1939 and thus during World War II. The supposed purpose of the pact, as a defensive coalition against communism to counteract the potential of Soviet aggression, became outdated when most of its European member states became engaged in the German-Soviet War.[2]: 49 

Effect of German military victories in the Westfeldzug

In March 1940, Joachim von Ribbentrop once again set about mobilizing Italy, the Soviet Union and especially Japan for his vision of a four-power coalition against the British Empire. In June 1940, the overwhelming German victories in the Westfeldzug ("Western Campaign")saw the defeat of France, Belgium and the Netherlands. With French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies now effectively defenseless, the Tokyo government now felt enticed to once again diplomatically approach Germany, which it had previously distanced itself from after the German quid pro quo with the USSR.[7]: 41 [16]: 280  The Germans had also won some support with the Japanese ambassadors in Berlin and Rome, Hiroshi Ōshima and Toshio Shiratori, who were swayed by Germany's successes in the Polish campaign and started supporting Ribbentrop's diplomatic agenda.[16]: 279 

Japanese advance to Lạng Sơn in French Indochina in 1940

Japan, concerned that Germany might actually take the side of France and the Netherlands, possibly then reshaped to be German vassal states, in the colonial question, sought to assure Germany's support for a Japanese annexation of French and Dutch colonies in South East Asia. Ribbentrop was indeed willing to support such Japanese annexations, which had been part of his initial idea regarding the four-power pact's advantages from the Japanese perspective. He painted Japanese acquisitions in East Asia as preparations for a world order where all of Afro-Eurasia would be divided between Germany, Italy, Japan and the Soviet Union.

Mais uma vez, Ribbentrop tentou assim realizar sua visão de uma coalizão de quatro potências dirigida contra o Reino Unido. Com a França eliminada e a Batalha da Grã-Bretanha indo a favor da Grã-Bretanha, ficou cada vez mais claro que o Reino Unido, embora com o pé atrás, não buscaria uma trégua nem seria nocauteado pela invasão alemã. Como resultado, o papel dos Estados Unidos ainda neutros e o apoio americano ao Reino Unido tornaram-se cada vez mais importantes para a condução do esforço de guerra da Alemanha. Ribbentrop ainda se iludia de que a cooperação com a União Soviética poderia ser permanente ou pelo menos durar até que a guerra com o Reino Unido terminasse. Essa opinião não foi compartilhada por Adolf Hitler, que ainda via a União Soviética "judaica-bolchevista" como o inimigo final inevitável da Alemanha.: 281–282 

Pacto Tripartite

As diferenças entre a Alemanha e o Japão, incluindo a guerra japonesa na China, as diferenças econômicas e o Pacto Molotov-Ribbentrop , levaram a uma distância crescente entre a Alemanha e o Japão. As vitórias da Alemanha sobre os aliados europeus em 1940 levaram a um desejo de reconciliação entre as partes. [74] Isso aconteceu como parte do Pacto Tripartite de 27 de setembro de 1940. No entanto, a desconfiança japonesa no parceiro alemão permaneceu, e o Japão evitou o envolvimento na eventual guerra da Alemanha contra a União Soviética para se concentrar totalmente em sua própria luta na China. . [45] : 63 No Pacto Tripartite, alemães e italianos reconheceram a liderança japonesa no leste da Ásia, e o Japão, inversamente, reconheceu a liderança alemã e italiana na Europa. [12] : 802 

Extensão do pacto

Protocolo de extensão do Pacto Anti-Comintern [25 de novembro de 1941]

O Governo do Reich Alemão, o Governo Real Italiano e o Governo Imperial Japonês, bem como o Governo Real Húngaro, o Governo Imperial de Manchukuo e o Governo Espanhol,

no reconhecimento de que as ações tomadas por eles para a proteção contra a Internacional Comunista produziram os melhores resultados,

bem como na convicção de que os interesses correspondentes dos seus países continuam a exigir uma cooperação estreita contra o inimigo comum,

decidiram prolongar a duração dos referidos acordos e, para o efeito, acordaram nas seguintes disposições:

1. O pacto contra a Internacional Comunista, que resulta do acordo e protocolo adicional de 25 de novembro de 1936, bem como do protocolo de 6 de novembro de 1937 e que a Hungria aderiu pelo protocolo de 24 de fevereiro de 1939, Manchukuo pelo protocolo de 24 de fevereiro 1939 e Espanha pelo protocolo de 27 de março de 1939, é prorrogado por cinco anos, a partir de 25 de novembro de 1941.

2. Os Estados que, a convite do Reich alemão, do Governo Real Italiano ou do Governo Imperial Japonês, como signatários iniciais do pacto contra a Internacional Comunista pretendem aderir a este pacto, transmitirão suas declarações de adesão por escrito ao Governo do Reich alemão, que, por sua vez, informará os demais Estados signatários da recepção dessas declarações. A adesão entra em vigor no dia da recepção da declaração de adesão pelo Governo do Reich alemão.

3. (1) O presente protocolo está redigido nos idiomas alemão, italiano e japonês, e todas as três versões são consideradas as versões originais. Entra em vigor no dia da assinatura.

(2) Os altos Estados signatários notificar-se-ão a seu tempo antes de expirar o prazo estabelecido no Artigo 1 com relação ao desenho futuro de sua cooperação.

Arquivos Federais Alemães. 1937 – 1941; Die Kriegsjahre; 6 : 15. Setembro bis 11. Dezembro 1941. Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945 aus dem Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (em alemão). D-13,2. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck + Ruprecht. págs. 671-672.

O Pacto Anti-Comintern estava programado para ser renovado em 25 de novembro de 1941, já que sua vida útil de cinco anos desde 25 de novembro de 1936 estava prestes a se esgotar. Um dos principais objetivos da Alemanha era manter o Japão próximo e encorajar o Japão a intervir na Guerra Alemão-Soviética ao lado da Alemanha, mas o Japão se recusou a fazê-lo pelo resto da guerra. O Pacto de Neutralidade Soviético-Japonês , assinado em abril de 1941, duraria até agosto de 1945, quando a União Soviética violou o pacto e invadiu a Manchúria japonesa. [75] : 230  [12] : 887 

A convenção dos vários signatários entre 24 e 25 de novembro de 1941 em Berlim que levou à renovação do pacto foi descrita por Ciano em seus diários como afirmação dos alemães como "donos da casa" dentro das Potências do Eixo. Os participantes incluíram Galeazzo Ciano da Itália, Serrano Suñer da Espanha, László Bárdossy da Hungria e Mihai Antonescu da Romênia, entre outros. [63] : 411 

O protocolo de extensão foi assinado em 25 de novembro de 1941 e traz as assinaturas dos representantes dos seis signatários anteriores: Ribbentrop (Alemanha), Ōshima (Japão), Ciano (Itália), Bárdossy (Hungria), Lü Yiwen (Manchukuo) e Suñer ( Espanha). [66] : 671–672 

Os signatários anteriores voltaram ao pacto. [2] : 49  [66] : 671–672 

Além disso, vários novos países que não o fizeram antes de 25 de novembro de 1941 aderiram ao Pacto Anti-Comintern. [2] : 49  [66] : 671–672  [76] : 1713  A China sob Wang Jingwei apresentou sua assinatura com antecedência em 22 de novembro de 1941, os outros países enviaram no dia da assinatura, 25. [f] [66] : 671–672 

A reação à extensão na imprensa controlada pelo Estado alemão, ao contrário do protocolo anterior, foi muito fria em relação ao Japão e, em vez disso, enfatizou os sacrifícios e sucessos do Eixo Europeu contra a União Soviética na Guerra Germano-Soviética. Isso não mudaria significativamente até 7 de dezembro de 1941, quando os japoneses atacaram Pearl Harbor. [26] : 156 

Bulgária

A Bulgária era um país que estava preso entre suas próprias ambições expansionistas nos Bálcãs, para as quais dependia da assistência militar italiana e alemã e do apoio diplomático, ao mesmo tempo em que tentava evitar um grande envolvimento nas operações do Eixo. Seu líder Boris III , aclamado como um "czar libertador" e um unificador dos territórios búlgaros perdidos, só poderia alcançar esse status devido ao apoio militar dos exércitos do Eixo, mas pretendia em 1941 evitar o envolvimento búlgaro na guerra germano-soviética. na Frente Oriental. Isso foi bem sucedido e as tropas búlgaras não participaram da Operação Barbarossa, mas a permanência das reivindicações territoriais da Bulgária permaneceu completamente à mercê das Potências do Eixo, já que a Alemanha em particular estava hesitante em ver qualquer assentamento territorial nos Bálcãs após as vitórias do Eixo sobre a Grécia e a Iugoslávia como final. Como resultado, a Bulgária foi forçada a agradar o parceiro alemão o máximo possível, evitando a etapa final de hostilidades abertas contra a União Soviética. [77]

Como parte dessa posição pró-alemã, a Bulgária foi essencialmente forçada a aderir ao Pacto Anti-Comintern em novembro de 1941. Logo depois, em 13 de dezembro, o país declarou guerra ao Reino Unido e aos Estados Unidos. A Bulgária tentou manter a neutralidade em relação à União Soviética até o fim, mas depois que a Romênia mudou de lado em favor dos Aliados e permitiu que o Exército Vermelho passasse pelo território romeno para invadir a Bulgária, o golpe de estado búlgaro de 1944 abriu o caminho para a Guerra do Povo. República da Bulgária . Os regentes do czar Simeão II foram executados. [77]

Croácia

A Croácia, o parceiro mais importante da Alemanha nos Balcãs durante as campanhas anti-partidárias, [77] foi criada em 1941 após a ocupação alemã da Jugoslávia. [70] Aderiu ao Pacto Anti-Comintern em novembro de 1941. Tal adesão foi feita com o objetivo de legitimar o estado croata e torná-lo mais independente, mas também para tomar uma posição clara contra a União Soviética. [78] : 272 

Dinamarca

A Dinamarca, juntamente com a Noruega , foi ocupada pela Alemanha na sequência da Operação Weserübung que começou em 9 de abril de 1940. O governo em Copenhague respondeu ao ataque alemão fazendo com que o exército dinamarquês se retirasse e aceitando o que foi enquadrado pela Alemanha como ocupação protetora . A decisão dinamarquesa foi muito diferente da norueguesa, pois o governo em Oslo optou por lutar em vez de se render e, como resultado, a ocupação alemã da Dinamarca estava entre as mais leves de todas as ocupações alemãs na Europa.

Ainda assim, qualquer noção de independência dinamarquesa era apenas uma farsa para fins de propaganda estrangeira, e as autoridades alemãs observavam seus colegas dinamarqueses de perto. [79] : 62–66  Embora houvesse um espectro considerável de simpatia pela causa alemã entre o público dinamarquês, a maioria dos civis dinamarqueses se ressentiu de seus ocupantes e as autoridades militares alemãs duvidaram da conformidade e lealdade dinamarquesas. [80] : 42-130  tentativas alemãs de melhorar sua posição na opinião pública na Dinamarca, através de medidas como o estabelecimento da Sociedade Dinamarquês-Alemanha com Peter Knutzen como presidente, não tiveram sucesso. [80] : 54–55 

O governo dinamarquês solicitou quatro isenções principais específicas para a Dinamarca. [82] : 173–180 

  • A Dinamarca não assume obrigações militares.
  • A ação anticomunista na Dinamarca deve limitar-se às operações policiais.
  • O tratado deve ser limitado ao território dinamarquês.
  • A Dinamarca permanecerá neutra na Segunda Guerra Mundial.

Os alemães, um tanto insatisfeitos com esses pedidos, os transferiram para um adendo secreto como um compromisso, fazendo com que a Dinamarca aparecesse como membro pleno do pacto do lado de fora. Isso prejudicou a reputação internacional do governo civil dinamarquês entre os Aliados. [82] : 173–180 

Finlândia

Na Finlândia , o status do país durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial permanece controverso até os dias modernos, pois os historiadores debatem se a Finlândia era um membro pleno das Potências do Eixo ou estava, como foi reivindicado pelo governo finlandês durante a guerra, apenas em um estado de co-beligerância ( finlandês : kanssasotija , sueco : medkrigförande ) com a Alemanha na luta finlandesa-alemã contra a União Soviética. A entrada finlandesa no Pacto Anti-Comintern em 25 de novembro de 1941, juntamente com outros elementos, como o reconhecimento explícito da Finlândia de ter sido um aliado da "Alemanha hitlerista" no Tratado de Paz de 1947, formam o caso a favor de argumentar que a Finlândia fazia parte do as Potências do Eixo. [81]: 101 

Nanquim China

O " Governo Nacional Reorganizado da República da China ", também conhecido como "China-Nanjing" ou regime de Wang Jingwei, um estado fantoche japonês estabelecido em Nanjing pelo derrotado político do Partido Nacionalista Wang Jingwei em março de 1940, juntou-se ao Anti- Pacto Comintern em 25 de novembro de 1941. Ele havia submetido sua assinatura ao tratado com antecedência, em 22 de novembro. [66] : 671–672 

Romênia

A Romênia era o parceiro militarmente mais importante da Alemanha na guerra contra a União Soviética, mas seus parceiros alemães fizeram pouco para conquistar ativamente essa lealdade. A Alemanha supervisionou em rápida sucessão três perdas territoriais na Romênia, quando concedeu pela primeira vez a região da Bessarábia à União Soviética no Pacto Molotov-Ribbentrop, depois concedeu grandes partes da região da Transilvânia à Hungria como parte do Segundo Prêmio de Viena e, finalmente, aprovou os ganhos territoriais búlgaros na região de Dobruja como parte do Tratado de Craiova . [77] Romênia, sob a liderança da Guarda de Ferro fascista, teve assim seus principais inimigos não apenas na União Soviética, mas também entre as fileiras das Potências do Eixo, especialmente na forma da Hungria. Ainda assim, a Guarda de Ferro, que antes das perdas territoriais defendia uma posição pró-alemã, agora via o alinhamento com a Alemanha como a única maneira de evitar outra intervenção alemã contra a Romênia e a favor da Hungria. A participação romena no Pacto Anti-Comintern em 25 de novembro de 1941 surgiu da necessidade de agradar o parceiro alemão e promover a campanha romena contra a União Soviética, para recuperar a Bessarábia e fazer aquisições territoriais na Ucrânia soviética. [6] : 268 

Eslováquia

A Eslováquia, estabelecida em 1939 após a dissolução da Tchecoslováquia instigada pelos alemães, aderiu ao Pacto Anti-Comintern em 25 de novembro de 1941. [66] : 674 

Assinaturas sugeridas

Entre 1936 e 1945, as Potências do Eixo usaram o Pacto Anti-Comintern como uma ferramenta diplomática para aumentar sua influência política e diplomática, mas muitas vezes não tiveram sucesso.

Argentina, Brasil e Chile

Houve esforços da Alemanha para envolver no pacto o ABC-Staaten da América do Sul (''Estados ABC'), composto por Argentina, Brasil e Chile. [56] : 687 

O presidente brasileiro Getúlio Vargas havia estabelecido a nova constituição do Estado Novo de novembro de 1937 sob o pretexto da insurgência comunista, e o Brasil era, assim, considerado o principal ponto de entrada para o Pacto Anti-Comintern na América do Sul. O governo brasileiro prometeu que sua convicção anticomunista doméstica continuaria, mas recusou a entrada no Pacto Anti-Comintern com base no fato de não querer ofender diplomaticamente o Reino Unido ou os Estados Unidos. No entanto, o ministro brasileiro Francisco Luiz da Silva Campos mostrou interesse na ajuda alemã para uma Exposição Anti  - Comintern brasileira semelhante às que já haviam sido realizadas na Alemanha. [56] : 687–688 

China

A China fazia parte da visão de Ribbentrop para o Pacto Anti-Comintern em 1935, e tinha sido cortejada tanto pela Alemanha quanto pelo Japão para se juntar ao Pacto Anti-Comintern já em 1936. [31] : 342–346  No final de 1935, Wang Jingwei foi a favor da adesão ao pacto, mas Chiang Kai-shek teve o cuidado de não ofender a União Soviética, que era o único parceiro potencial da China em caso de um ataque japonês. [83] : 237 

Após séria consideração, a administração Chiang recusou. [38] : 76  Eles não estavam dispostos a se alinhar com o Japão sem uma retirada das forças japonesas da China. Tal recuo foi rejeitado pelo Japão, o que significava que a China não estava disposta a ofender a União Soviética, a única grande potência que seria capaz de ajudá-los efetivamente no caso de uma guerra contra o Japão. Esta guerra tornou-se realidade no ano seguinte. [45] : 54, 77  Em 3 de novembro de 1938, o primeiro-ministro japonês Fumimaro Konoe em uma transmissão pública ofereceu termos de paz que incluíam a adesão chinesa ao Pacto Anti-Comintern. [55] : 113 

Entre dezembro de 1939 e março de 1940, negociações de paz preliminares foram realizadas no âmbito do Projeto Kiri japonês . Os termos redigidos envolviam a adesão chinesa ao Pacto Anti-Comintern. O governo chinês perdeu tempo e não deu uma resposta definitiva à proposta. Em 7 de setembro, o lado japonês declarou mais negociações inúteis e o Projeto Kiri foi encerrado em 8 de outubro de 1940. [84] : 176  Outra tentativa de negociações de paz exploratórias foi feita por Qian Yongming  [ zh ] para o lado chinês, que tinha dois delegados com Yosuke Matsuokaem Tóquio em 12 de outubro de 1940. Sua proposta de paz entre o Japão e a China e a unificação dos governos de Wang e Chiang também incluía a entrada do estado chinês unificado no Pacto Anti-Comintern. [84] : 178 

Checoslováquia

A adesão da Tchecoslováquia ao Pacto Anti-Comintern fazia parte das demandas alemãs no período que antecedeu o estabelecimento do Protetorado . Estas exigências foram concebidas pela Alemanha para serem rejeitadas. [12] : 439 

Holanda

A Holanda foi o candidato escolhido pelos japoneses para inclusão no Pacto Anti-Comintern. [19] : 41  O embaixador japonês Iwao Yamaguchi esperava que as preocupações holandesas sobre a situação na China e a possível dissidência dos habitantes étnicos chineses das Índias Orientais Holandesas , bem como insurgentes comunistas na colônia, levassem o governo holandês a tentar estabilizar a relação com o Japão através da adesão ao pacto.

Yamaguchi entrou em contato com o ministro das Relações Exteriores holandês Andries Cornelis Dirk de Graeff sobre o assunto em 12 de outubro de 1936, mas o governo holandês viu-se obrigado pela opinião pública a rejeitar qualquer alinhamento diplomático com o Japão, e De Graeff apontou que a atividade comunista nas Índias Orientais Holandesas não era uma ameaça iminente. No entanto, ele estava disposto a pelo menos negociar uma troca de inteligência com o Japão para fins de atividade anticomunista na Ásia. Uma segunda reunião em 24 de outubro de 1936 viu De Graeff descrever que apenas as Índias Orientais Holandesas deveriam ser incluídas em qualquer troca de inteligência, enquanto Yamaguchi esperava incluir o continente holandês com o objetivo de frustrar as operações do Comintern em Amsterdã .(e influenciando secretamente os jornais holandeses a serem menos críticos do Japão em suas reportagens). No dia seguinte, 25 de outubro de 1936, Tony Lovink contatou Yamaguchi sobre uma potencial política holandesa na qual não apenas o comunismo, mas todas as ideologias políticas nas Índias Orientais Holandesas poderiam ser suprimidas e supervisionadas em cooperação com os japoneses. Este foi o primeiro de muitos sinais de que o governo holandês não estava muito preocupado em combater o comunismo, mas sim em suprimir o movimento de independência da Indonésia nas Índias Orientais Holandesas. [19] : 41–42 

Embora a Holanda continuasse interessada em trocas secretas de inteligência, o governo holandês hesitou em empreender oficialmente um alinhamento diplomático com o Japão, causado pelo medo de uma reação doméstica e diplomática. [19] : 41–42 

Noruega

Como parte da ocupação alemã da Noruega e do regime colaboracionista de Quisling da Noruega , a adesão de Quisling Noruega ao Pacto Anti-Comintern foi discutida, mais notavelmente no Memorandum alemão über die Neuordnung in Norwegen ("Memorando sobre a Reorganização da Noruega"), emitido em Oslo em 10 de fevereiro de 1942. [85] : 465–470 

Polônia

Em 1935, a Polônia era um dos países que Ribbentrop esperava induzir a aderir ao pacto. [31] : 342–346 A  Polônia também era um parceiro muito desejado no Japão, que via a Alemanha e a Polônia como bastante próximas por causa de seu Pacto de Não Agressão de 1934 e que via a Polônia como muito comprometida em suas posições anticomunistas e anti-soviéticas . [19] : 31 

Quando Ribbentrop e Neurath estavam em contato com Józef Lipski e Józef Beck sobre a cooperação anticomunista germano-polonesa, Beck rejeitou uma entrada polonesa no Pacto Anti-Comintern como impraticável. [56] : 31–33, 38–39  A entrada polonesa no Pacto Anti-Comintern fazia parte do plano de oito pontos apresentado à Polônia por Joachim von Ribbentrop . [56] : 88  [86] : 8  A Polónia rejeitou esta proposta. [12] : 455 As razões para a rejeição da proposta pela Polônia foram o desejo polonês de uma equidistância diplomática entre a Alemanha e a União Soviética, bem como as preocupações militares sobre a invasão do cerco pela Alemanha após a dissolução da Tchecoslováquia. [86] : 8 

Portugal

Portugal era de interesse como um possível estado membro, especialmente após a adesão da Espanha. Como um dos três únicos países que votaram contra a entrada da União Soviética na Liga das Nações em 18 de setembro de 1934 (além da Holanda e Suíça), [87] tinha um histórico anti-soviético bem estabelecido. No entanto, sua dependência econômica e aliança diplomática de longa data com o Reino Unido fez com que Portugal não aceitasse um convite para o Pacto Anti-Comintern aos olhos de Oswald Baron von Hoyningen-Huene , o embaixador alemão em Portugal 1934-1945. [66] : 644 

Reino Unido

A adesão britânica fazia parte do projeto original de Ribbentrop para o Pacto Anti-Comintern em outubro de 1935. [31] : 342–346  Quando Joachim von Ribbentrop se tornou embaixador no Reino Unido em 1936, Hitler deixou claro para ele que era seu 'maior desejo ' para acolher a Grã-Bretanha no Pacto Anti-Comintern. Ribbentrop estava cético em relação à ambição de Hitler, mas colocou alguma esperança no rei Eduardo VIII , que Ribbentrop percebeu ser amigável com a Alemanha. [6] : 154–155  [13] : 262–263  Quando perguntado em 15 de novembro de 1937 se o governo britânico havia recebido um convite para o Pacto Anti-Comintern, o subsecretário de Relações Exteriores Robert Gascoyne-Cecilrespondeu que não havia tal convite. [88]

Iugoslávia

A Iugoslávia era amiga do Eixo durante o mandato de Milan  Stojadinović como primeiro-ministro, e a Alemanha e a Itália estavam otimistas sobre sua adesão em janeiro de 1939 . não alinhados. [63] : 22  A administração Cvetković, pressionada pelo alinhamento diplomático da Romênia, Hungria e Bulgária com as Potências do Eixo, juntou-se ao sucessor do Pacto Anti-Comintern, o Pacto Tripartite, em 25 de março de 1941. Dušan Simović , em resposta, golpe iugoslavo estadoem 27 de março, cancelando a entrada da Iugoslávia no Pacto Tripartite. Em resposta, as Potências do Eixo iniciaram a invasão da Iugoslávia em 6 de abril. [70] : 71 

Legado

O Pacto Anti-Comintern acabou desempenhando um papel significativo nos julgamentos de Nuremberg e foi especificamente mencionado no veredicto que condenou Joachim von Ribbentrop à morte. [62] : 285 

Recepção histórica e historiografia

Paul W. Schroeder, 1958

Outro desenvolvimento, pouco perigoso em si, mas portentoso do que está por vir, foi a conclusão de um Pacto Anti-Comintern entre o Japão e a Alemanha em novembro de 1936. Embora fosse um acordo ostensivamente limitado para troca de informações e consultas sobre a subversão comunista, serviu para dar uma base tangível para a crença de que a Alemanha nazista e o Japão imperial eram muito parecidos e ligados entre si.

Paul W. Schroeder : A Aliança do Eixo e Relações Japonês-Americanas 1941 (1958). ISBN 0801403715 . pág. 7. 

O historiador americano Paul W. Schroeder , professor emérito da Universidade de Illinois , interpreta o Pacto Anti-Comintern em seu livro de 1958 The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations 1941 como uma declaração diplomática da Alemanha e do Japão que não tinha valor militar real e foi "dificilmente perigoso em si". [26] : 7  Schroeder também comenta sobre os laços germano-japoneses bastante frouxos que resultaram do pacto, [26] : 109  bem como a falta de compromisso alemão e japonês com o acordo. [26] : 14 A conclusão de Schroeder, em última análise, vê no Pacto Anti-Comintern uma continuação de um padrão na política externa japonesa desde a década de 1890, em que o Japão era oportunista em agarrar as chances de expansão, como na Primeira Guerra Sino-Japonesa de 1894 , a Guerra Russo-Japonesa de 1904 e as vinte e uma demandas de 1915 . [26] : 171 

Ruth Henig, 1985

A marcha progressiva do fascismo foi sublinhada pelo pacto anti-comintern concluído entre a Alemanha e o Japão em novembro de 1936, para combater a propagação dos regimes comunistas. Foi ostensivamente dirigido contra a URSS, mas as relações aparentemente estreitas estabelecidas entre os dois governos também representavam uma séria ameaça ao império britânico. Essa ameaça foi ampliada quando a Itália aderiu ao pacto no final de 1937.

Ruth Henig : As Origens da Segunda Guerra Mundial 1933-1941 . ISBN 0415332621 . pág. 30. 

Ruth Henig , historiadora britânica e mais tarde política do Partido Trabalhista , observou em seu livro de 1985 The Origins of the Second World War 1933-1941 o componente ideológico do acordo, em que o pacto Anti-Comintern sublinhou a "marcha adiante do fascismo" para "para combater a propagação de regimes comunistas", mas apontou que uma ameaça real do pacto também veio para o Reino Unido democrático liberal . [59] : 30  Em uma contribuição de 2001 para a Conferência de Paz de Paris, 1919: Paz sem Vitória, Henig também observa que o público na Alemanha, Itália, Japão e até mesmo no próprio Reino Unido não estava muito interessado na política externa e na garantia da paz internacional, e que aqueles poucos indivíduos que se interessavam ativamente pelos assuntos globais muitas vezes o faziam de forma chauvinista e nacionalisticamente. Henig também comentou que o período entre guerras 1918-1939 foi marcado pelo rompimento de antigas alianças (como a Aliança Anglo-Japonesa e a Frente Stresa). [59] : 157–174 

Manfred Messerschmidt, 1990

O pacto anti-Comintern de 25 de novembro de 1936 [...] refletiu um afastamento da China, contrário às preferências dos líderes militares e empresariais, e também a incerteza do plano da Alemanha entre o Japão e a Grã-Bretanha. O 'pacto' não era mais do que um acordo para trocar informações sobre as atividades da Terceira Internacional, e o 'protocolo suplementar secreto' era apenas uma promessa de neutralidade e consulta, não uma aliança militar. Assim, o pacto anti-Comintern, como o Eixo, foi apenas um remendo de interesses políticos divergentes.

MGFA : The Build-up of German Agression (1990). ISBN 019822866X . pág. 639. 

Como parte da série Alemanha e a Segunda Guerra Mundial do Escritório de Pesquisa de História Militar do Bundeswehr alemão, o historiador militar alemão Manfred Messerschmidt afirma no primeiro volume, The Build-up of German Aggression (1990), que o Pacto Anti-Comintern, assim como o Axis Powers como um todo, foi apenas um "remendo de interesses políticos divergentes". Messerschmidt também comenta a ambivalência de Hitler entre incluir a Itália ou o Reino Unido no pacto. [18] : 639 No que diz respeito ao papel do Japão, Messerschmidt, como Schroeder, vê o Pacto Anti-Comintern como uma continuação da política japonesa estabelecida, mas também observa que o aparato político interno do Japão estava tão dividido entre os interesses do exército, marinha e governo japoneses que quase por definição, nenhuma ação da liderança de Tóquio poderia ser vista como qualquer tipo de opinião unificada de todo o establishment japonês. Messerschmidt também discorda da noção de que a adesão da Itália ao pacto necessariamente lhe deu um impulso antibritânico, mas que a adesão italiana estabeleceu a base do tratado em primeiro lugar. Os interesses da Alemanha e do Japão eram muito diferentes e a posição japonesa após o início da guerra contra a China em 1937 era muito fraca para representar uma ameaça a qualquer inimigo, União Soviética ou Reino Unido. Como resultado,[18] : 641 

No entanto, Messerschmidt concorda que o apoio de Hitler ao Japão, que seguiu a agenda de Ribbentrop no Extremo Oriente, estava destinado a prejudicar as relações anglo-germânicas, quer Hitler quisesse ou não. As ações que a Alemanha tomou que favoreceu o Japão e desfavoreceu a China incluíram a interrupção das entregas de ajuda ao governo de Chiang, a retirada de conselheiros da China e declarações abertas de apoio político às ações japonesas a partir de outubro de 1937. Todas essas ações, de acordo com Messerschmidt's argumento, foram obrigados a ofender a posição pró-chinesa do Reino Unido. [18] : 640–642 

Ian Kershaw, 2000

Em 27 de novembro de 1936, Hitler aprovou o que ficou conhecido como o Pacto Anti-Comintern (ao qual a Itália aderiu um ano depois), sob cuja principal disposição – em um protocolo secreto – nenhuma das partes ajudaria a União Soviética de forma alguma no caso de atacar. Alemanha ou Japão. O pacto era mais importante por seu simbolismo do que por suas disposições reais: as duas potências mais militaristas e expansionistas do mundo haviam se encontrado. Embora o pacto fosse ostensivamente defensivo, dificilmente aumentara as perspectivas de paz em ambos os lados do globo.

Ian Kershaw : Hitler 1936–45: Nemesis. ISBN 0393049949 . pág. 27. 

Em sua biografia de Adolf Hitler, o historiador britânico Sir Ian Kershaw escreveu em 2000 que a aprovação de Hitler para o Pacto Anti-Comintern marcou a união diplomática das "duas potências expansionistas mais militaristas do mundo", mas que "[o] pacto era mais importante por seu simbolismo do que por suas disposições reais". [27] : 27  Kershaw em sua interpretação das estruturas de poder dentro da Alemanha nazista é um proponente da tese "trabalhar para o Führer", na qual, enquanto Hitler era a figura ideológica orientadora no estado alemão, que favorece todos os atores políticos dentro do O governo alemão (no caso do Pacto Anti-Comintern: Ribbentrop) tentou vencer, o ditador estava de fato pouco envolvido nos assuntos governamentais do dia-a-dia.

Veja também

Notas

  1. Participantes da reunião da embaixada: Kintomo Mushanokōji, Hiroshi Ōshima, Kojiro Inoue, Dr. Hiroo Furuuchi, Tadao Yokoi.
  2. O Tratado de Berlim baseou-se no Tratado de Rapallo e o designou como base das relações germano-soviéticas. Esta declaração da Alemanha de Weimar havia sido perfeitamente transportada para o estado nazista, que afirmou e estendeu o Tratado de Berlim em 5 de maio de 1933.
  3. Participantes da reunião de março de 1936: Arita, Terauchi, Machijiri, Mushanokōji, Shigemitsu, possivelmente outros.
  4. ^ 10 de novembro de 1937: https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1937-11-10/debates/97c6b766-8736-40b2-8d14-316669caf24b/Anti-CominternPact – 15 de novembro de 1937: https://hansard.parliament .uk/Commons/1937-11-15/debates/2cf1d7ec-1ab9-44a6-8fbb-5cc4885bac8a/Anti-CominternPact – 5 de dezembro de 1938: https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1938-12-05/debates /198662c2-eafb-4c62-b38b-914e84a5fef9/Anti-CominternPact
  5. Embora o documento em si não mencione o primeiro nome do oficial em questão, está especificado no registro de pessoas (Ergänzungsband zu den Serien A – E, p. 361) que a pessoa chamada Thomas mencionada em D-5 é Georg Tomás.
  6. ^ Files of the countries' entries in the German archives, by country: Bulgaria (2871/D 564 636), Croatia (2871/D 564 639), Denmark (2871/D 564 637), Finland (2871/D 564 638), Romania (2871/D 564 643), Slovakia (2871/D 564 644).

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External links